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IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT 
FILED 
AT'--'--~ 0 CLOCK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
W ALCO, INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political subdivision 
of the State of Idaho, and 
SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE, INC., 
an Idaho corporation, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) . Case No. CV 42360 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
___________ ) 
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Defendants advanced new and incorrect arguments in their Reply to the Plaintiffs 
Opposition to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus, Walco was unable to 
adequately correct those inaccuracies. It appears that those same inaccuracies formed the basis of 
the Court's decision to dismiss Walco's trade secrets misappropriation claim. For this reason, 
Walco respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its decision to grant summary judgment to 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-I 
the Defendants for the following three reasons: 
First, Idaho is a Uniform Trade Secrets Act jurisdiction. The UTSA broadly construes trade 
secrets to include single events such as a bid amount. Likewise, the Idaho Trade Secrets Act does 
not contain a continuous use requirement. This Court, however, made a per se decision that a bid 
cannot be a trade secret. Because the ITSA does not make such a limitation and because case law 
supports a definition that includes trade secrets, this Court should find that as a matter of law, a 
bid amount is information that falls within the definition of a trade secret. 
Second, what constitutes a trade secret is a question of fact. A trade secret is one that 
derives independent economic value and is the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy. 
Walco maintains that a rational jury could conclude from the facts that the bid amount was of 
independent economic value and that Walco took reasonable steps to maintain the secrecy of the 
bid amount. Because the issue is a factual one, and because genuine issues of material facts exist, 
this Court should find that the matter is not ripe for summary judgment. 
Third, whether a trade secret is misappropriated is also a question of fact. Idaho law 
specifies that a trade secret is misappropriated either by a person who wrongfully acquires a 
trade secret or by a person who wrongfully discloses a trade secret. Vvalco detailed genuine 
issues of material fact with regard to Simmons who wrongfully acquired the bid amount and with 
regard to Idaho County that wrongfully disclosed the bid amount. None of Walco's attempts to 
mitigate damages caused by the misappropriation work to estop Walco from now raising the 
misappropriation claims. Because the issue is a factual one, and because genuine issues of 
material facts exist, this Court should find that the matter is not ripe for summary judgment. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-2 
As the Court has entered no final order, Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is timely 
brought under I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B), which states, "a motion for reconsideration of any 
interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment 
but not later than fourteen days after the entry of the final judgment." A trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Jordan v. 
Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P .3d 908, 914 (2201). A party making a motion for 
reconsideration is permitted to present new evidence but is not required to do so. Johnson v. 
Lambors, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P .3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The burden of 
establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the moving party. Van v. 
Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). This Court will construe the 
record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, 
drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Id. Summary judgment is improper "if 
reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the 
evidence presented." McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,394, 64 P.3d 317,320 (2003). 
III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
A. The Idaho Trade Secrets Act extends protection to information such as bid amounts. 
1. The UTSA, upon which the ITSA is patterned, includes information such as bids 
as trade secrets. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARYJUDGMENT-3 
Idaho is considered a Uniform Trade Secret Act jurisdiction because Idaho adopted the 
UTSA. fact, while some states adopted the UTSA for the most part, yet altered the definition 
of trade secret, Idaho did not alter the definition and adopted the exact UTSA definition of trade 
secret. 1 This motion to reconsider is necessarily brought because the Defendants asked this 
Court to find that Restatement §759 does not apply and that only Restatement§ 757 applies, thus 
precluding a bid from being defined as a trade secret. The UTSA, however, actually 
encompassed both sections, thereby superseding Restatement§ 757 with regard to the definition 
of a trade secret. According to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act With 1985 Amendments, the 
UTSA "contains a reasonable departure from the Restatement of Torts (First) definition which 
required that a trade secret be 'continuously used in one's business.' The broader definition in the 
proposed Act extends protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an opportunity or acquired the 
means to put a trade secret to use." (UTSA with 1985 Amendments, p. 6, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ shared/ docs/trade%20secrets/utsa final 85. pdf.) Furthermore, the 
Uniform Law Commissioners, in summarizing a trade secret, stated that a trade secret "is, 
basically, information of commercial value. The form of that information can be exceedingly 
variable.(http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act). 
While it is true that Idaho Courts do use the six Restatement § 757 factors to help 
determine if information is a trade secret or not, the definition itself in the Restatement § 757, 
1 Idaho Code§ 48-801(5) defines a "trade secret" as follows: 
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, computer program, device, 
method, technique, or process, that: 
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, 
and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic 
value from its disclosure or use; and 
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARYJUDGMENT-4 
which precludes nonrecurring events such as bids, does not supersede the ITSA broad definition 
' 
of trade secret. Additionally, Idaho Courts have made clear that after the passage of the ITSA, 
the use of the six factors are "no longer required to find a trade secret."(Basic Am. Inc. v. Shatila, 
133 Idaho at 735, 992 P .2d at 184.). But even if they are used, as Idaho courts have used them to 
"determine whether the information in a given case constitutes 'trade secrets' within the 
definition of the statute," the factors themselves do not preclude a bid amount from the definition 
of trade secret. Put another way, the six factors themselves do not call for a continuous use 
requirement, but only go to proving "whether the information in question is generally known or 
readily ascertainable." (Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 898 (Idaho 2010) 
quoting Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 735, 992 P.2d 175, 184 (1999)).2 And that 
question is one of fact. 
Further, to the extent that the Defendants argued that the Restatement is actually broader 
than the UTSA and ITSA, they err. Defendants simply quoted a footnote in Basic Am. v. Shatila, 
133 Idaho 726 (Idaho 1999) which stated, "The current Restatement definition of "trade secret" 
is even broader than that incorporated in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act: "A trade secret is any 
information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is 
sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others." 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION§ 39 (1995) (emphasis added). That 
particular quotation is comparing the 1995 Restatement of Competition's definition of Trade 
Secret to the UTSA definition of trade secret. That quotation is not referring to the Restatement § 
2 
"(l) the extent to which the information is known outside [the plaintiffs] business; (2) the 
extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the business; (3) the extent of 
measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information 
to him and his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing 
the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly 
acquired or duplicated by others. (Restatement of Torts§ 757 cmt. b (1939)). 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARYJUDGMENT-5 
757 that defines trade secrets as being a continuous process. Thus, the UTSA and ITSA 
definition of trade secret may not be as broad as the Restatement § 39, but it is most definitely 
broader than § 757 and certainly broad enough to include bid amounts. 
2. Case law supports the fact that the ITSA extends protection to information such 
as bid amounts. 
While the issue of whether information rises to the level of a trade secret or not is a 
question of fact, most jurisdictions agree that the definition of a trade secret is a matter of law. 
(Home Pride Foods, Inc. v. Johnson, 262 Neb. 701, 707 (Neb. 2001) reviewing precedent in 
numerous jurisdictions including Idaho). While this Court decided that the statutory definition of 
trade secret precluded bids, other jurisdictions have specifically held otherwise. In Ovation 
Plumbing, Inc., v. Furton, the plaintiff claimed that Furton had used Ovation's bid amount in 
order to undercut it. The Colorado Court of Appeals specified, "We will not read a continuous 
use requirement into this statute when it does not contain such language nor any indication of 
legislative intent to include this concept." (Ovation Plumbing, Inc. v. Furton, 33 P.3d 1221, 
1223-1224 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). While Colorado's Trade Secret Act differs in some respects 
from the ITSA, Utah's Trade Secret Act does not. Both Idaho and Utah adopted the exact 
definition of trade secret as that found in the Uniform Trade Secret Act. 3 
And, in 2012, the Utah Court of Appeals, like the Colorado Court of Appeals, agreed that 
the bid amount itself, falls within the definition of a trade secret. ( CDC Restoration & Cons tr., 
3 Utah Code 13-24-2. Definitions 
(4) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
device, method, technique, or process, that: 
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known 
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use; and 
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-6 
LC v. Tradesmen Contrs., LLC, 2012 UT App 60, P27-P35 (Utah Ct. App. 2012). In that case, 
the Appeals Court found that the trial court erred in ruling that CDC had produced no evidence 
that the Defendants used CDC's bid information, including the actual bid amount, in formulating 
the Defendants' own bid on the Project, and that thus, no genuine issues of material fact existed. 
Of note, the Court spent no time analyzing whether a bid amount fell within the definition of a 
trade secret or not, and simply clarified that it did. (Id.) Rather, it spent the majority of its 
analysis on whether there were material facts in dispute as to whether the defendants "ever saw 
or made use of CDC's bid for the project." (Id.) 
The same analysis should be applied here. The ITSA does not contain a continuous use 
requirement that would preclude a bid amount from being a trade secret under the ITSA. Further, 
other jurisdictions have specifically found that bid amounts fall squarely under the definition of a 
trade secret and are at the very least, not precluded from the definition. 
B. A rational jury could conclude from the facts that the bid amount is a trade secret 
because it had independent economic value and because Walco took reasonable steps to 
maintain the secrecy of the bid amount. 
1. A jury could conclude that the bid amount had an independEmt economic value. 
As discussed previously, whether information rises to the level of a trade secret is an 
issue of fact based on sections "a" and "b" of Idaho Code § 48-801(5). Both of the ITSA's 
statutory requirements focus fundamentally on the secrecy of the information sought to be 
protected. However, the requirements emphasize different aspects of secrecy. The first 
requirement is that the information be sufficiently secret to impart economic value because of its 
relative secrecy. Thus, if any material factual dispute exists, and construing all inferences in a 
light most favorable to Walco, the Court cannot make a decision regarding the trade secret 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-7 
information as a matter of law. Here, as to section "a," a jury could conclude that Walco's bid 
amount is a trade secret because it has an independent economic value. Even common sense 
dictates that a bid would qualify as a trade secret because it has an independent economic value. 
Take for instance, a slightly altered bidding scenario. Imagine that Walco submitted its sealed 
bid 3 days before due date. The bid amount was $87,000 for everything plus 5% annual 
adjustments. Walco submitted the sealed bid to the County Clerk. Later that day, another person 
who owns a sanitation collection company and is interested in bidding for the contract calls the 
County Clerk. He says he has his own transfer station but wants to bid $90,000 plus a yearly 6% 
adjustment. He asks her to unseal the bid and tell him Walco's bid amount. The Clerk obliges 
and the person later submits his bid for slightly less than Walco's amount. Certainly, Walco's bid 
amount had potential economic value because had the bidder not known the bid amount, Walco's 
bid would have been the lowest, winning bid. How can it be, in this scenario, that a bid does not 
constitute a trade secret? Yet that is the result of the ruling entered by this Court. The point is 
this: whether Walco's bid was the lowest or not, the fact that it did submit a bid and the fact that 
if Simmons knew the bid before he completed his own, then Walco's bid "(a) derives 
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not 
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value 
from its disclosure or use." (Idaho Code§ 48-801(5)). 
2. The facts could lead a jury to decide that Walco took all reasonable steps 
necessary to protect the trade secret. 
The second requirement, that the plaintiff take reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy 
of the information, prevents a plaintiff who takes no affirmative measures to prevent others from 
using its proprietary information from obtaining trade secret protection. The Act requires a 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARYJUDGMENT-8 
plaintiff to take affirmative measures to prevent others from distributing or usmg the 
information. Whether Walco did take all reasonable steps necessary to protect its bid amount is 
also a fact-finding process for the jury. The parties dispute whether Walco did take reasonable 
steps. Certainly, the following steps that Walco took prove that material facts are in dispute and 
construing all inferences in a light most favorable to Walco, summary judgment is not available 
to the Defendants. The first step Walco took was before the bid opening. Walco sent a June 7, 
2012 letter requesting that all of Walco's information with regard to the bidding process be 
treated as exempt under the Public Records Act. (Ackerman Deel. Ex. F ., Defendant Idaho 
County's Reply to Walco's Opposition).4 Second, Walco submitted its bid sealed. Third, Walco 
reasonably expected that its bid information would be kept secret, at least until all bids were 
complete. The RFP, itself, said: 
1. All Proposals received by the submission date identified in the 
Notice of Request for Proposal will be catalogued and distributed 
for preliminary review by County staff and/or its advisors. Each 
proposal will be reviewed for responsiveness and completeness by 
COUNTY and/or its advisors. At COUNTY'S discretion, proposers 
may be notified by COUNTY of omissions or of the need to modify 
the proposal, and a schedule of provision of the missing information 
or issuing an amended proposal may be established by COUNTY. 
4 Idaho Code § 9-340(D) part l, specifies, 9-340D. RECORDS EXEMPT FROM 
DISCLOSURE -- TRADE SECRETS, PRODUCTION RECORDS, APPRAISALS, BIDS, 
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION. The following records are exempt from disclosure: 
(1) Trade secrets including those contained in response to public agency or independent 
public body corporate and politic requests for proposal, requests for clarification, requests for 
information and similar requests. "Trade secrets" as used in this section means information, 
including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, computer program, device, method, 
technique, process, or unpublished or in progress research that: 
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, 
and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain economic 
value from its disclosure or use; and 
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
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2. Based on evaluation criteria set forth below, evaluation of 
Proposals found by COUNTY to satisfy minimum requirements 
will be conducted by COUNTY and/or its advisors. COUNTY may 
conduct interviews to discuss or clarify aspects of Proposals with 
some or all Proposers. (County RFP, Exhibit J 019). 
A jury could reasonably decide that based on the RFP terms, the County would not be 
announcing bid numbers for the first time in a public meeting before the bidders had completed 
their bids. Further Walco could reasonably expect that one complete bid would not be opened in 
front of bidders who had handed in incomplete bids that the County would allow to be completed 
over the course of several more public meetings. The evaluation forms noted that the bids would 
be evaluated in a preliminary review by County staff, not by County staff and the public and all 
other bidders. Then, the RFP evaluation specifies that if any bids are deemed incomplete, the 
County may contact that bidder to rehab his bid. It does not say that the County will discuss the 
incomplete bid in public and in comparison to a complete bid. Finally, the evaluation terms note 
that interviews may be conducted if further issues arise with the bids. A reasonable juror could 
also conclude that the evaluation terms inferred private, non-public meeting discussions with any 
bidder whose bid was incomplete. A reasonable juror could likewise conclude that Walco had 
the reasonable expectation that during those interviews, the bids from competing bidders would 
not be divulged. Certainly the Public Records Act itself requires that the County, itself, take 
reasonable steps to protect any trade secrets with respect to bids. The language of the Public 
Records Act and the RFP establishes that the County had a duty of secrecy that Walco should 
have been reasonably able to rely upon. 
In 2010, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's granting of summary 
judgment because the Appellate Court found that the trial court had erred in granting summary 
judgment on "all of plaintiffs claims based soley on its determination that the information in 
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question did not constitute trade secrets." (Kaib's Roving R.PH Agency, Inc. v. Smith, 237 Ore. 
App. 96, 98-105 (Or. Ct. App. 2010)). And although the case did not involve a bid amount, the 
following principle applies to this case as well, "[ A] trade secret is one of the most elusive and 
difficult concepts in the law to define. In many cases, the existence of a trade secret is not 
obvious; it requires an ad hoc evaluation of all the surrounding circumstances. For this reason, 
the question of whether certain information constitutes a trade secret ordinarily is best resolved 
by a fact finder after full presentation of evidence from each side." Id. quoting Learning Curve 
Toys, Inc. v. Play Wood Toys, Inc., 342 F3d 714, 723 (7th Cir 2003). 
C. Wako's public bid discussions after the bids were opened do not estop Walco from 
claiming that its trade secret was misappropriated. 
Once again, whether a trade secret was misappropriated or not is factual matter. In the 
Utah case, the Appellate Court explained, "A jury can infer misappropriation of a trade secret 
from circumstantial evidence. See USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 31, ,i 50, 235 P.3d 
749. Consequently, "presentation of circumstantial evidence may create a genuine issue of 
material fact foreclosing summary judgment." Id." CDC Restoration & Constr., LC v. 
Tradesmen Contrs., LLC, 2012 UT App 60, P27-P35 (Utah Ct. App. 2012). 
This Court decided that even if a bid could be a trade secret, the fact that Walco discussed 
its bid during public meetings estops Walco from making any misappropriation claims. But such 
a contention overlooks several salient facts. For one, the record proves that before Walco 
discussed the bids at public meetings, Skip Brandt had already secretly discussed the specifics of 
the Walco bid with Simmons. The day the bids were opened, the only bidder present at the 
meeting was Walco. 
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Second, Walco's attempts to mitigate damages should not operate to estop it from 
claiming trade secret misappropriation. Six minutes into the meeting where the County first 
opened the bids, the County had decided that Walco's bid was not compliant with the proposal 
terms and was the losing bid. Walco reacted by asserting the ways in which the Simmons bid 
appeared to be incomplete and how it was quite likely that Walco's bid was the lower of the two 
bids. Walco had a duty to try and mitigate the damages it believed it was about to suffer. One 
commissioner immediately disqualified Walco for not submitting a bid that tracked the exact 
language of the proposed contract while calling the other bid compliant even though it suffered 
defects that were far worse. Walco, over the course of several meetings, attempted to 
demonstrate that its' bid was in fact compliant and that the other was not. Thus, because Walco 
did all it could to mitigate its' damages, in a manner consistent with the law, it should not be 
estopped from pursuing a damages claim.because those efforts failed. What is very important to 
consider here is the fact that unbeknownst to Walco, while it was working to point out that it was 
compliant and the process was skewed in favor of Simmons, is that fact that Simmons already 
knew everything that Walco was discussing as it had been shared with him by Skip Brandt the 
day the bids were opened. 
CONCLUSION 
Walco respectfully requests that this Court reconsider the decision to grant the motion for 
summary judgment filed by the Defendants. In particular, Walco asks this Court to grant this 
motion for reconsideration and provide the following relief: 
1. Determine that material facts are in dispute as to whether the bid amount is a 
trade secret. 
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2. Determine that material facts are in dispute as to whether or not Walco took 
reasonable steps to protect the trade secrets in light of the letter, the manner in 
which the bid was presented, the language in the RFP and the language in the 
statute. 
3. Determine that W alco should not be estopped from presenting this case 
because it took reasonable steps to mitigate damages and it is those steps upon 
which the Court based it's decision to determine that the estoppel claim was 
valid. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of December, 2013 7 
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Attorney for Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
W ALCO, INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
COUNTY OF IDAHO~ a political subdivision 
of the State ofidaho, and SIMMONS 
SANITATION SERVICE, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
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DEFENDANT SIMMONS SANITATION 
SERVICE, INC. 'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW, Defendant SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation (hereinafter "Simmons"), by and through its attorney of record, David R. Risley of 
23 
Risley Law Office, PLLC, and submits the following memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs 
24 Motion for Reconsideration (hereinafter "Plaintiffs Motion"): 
25 
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I. 
STATUS OF PROCEEDINGS 
A. Count I Should Be Dismissed: Defendants asserted, and Plaintiff, Walco, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Walco") apparently concedes, there is no basis in fact or applicable law for a tortious 
interference claim against either Simmons or Idaho County as pled in Count I of Walco's 
7 Complaint. "Under Idaho law, it is factually impossible for a party to tortiously interfere with that 
8 party's own contract." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,844,243 P.3d 642, 660 (2010), citing 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut'l Ins. Co. of Idaho, Inc. 123 Idaho 650, 654, 851 P.2d 946, 950 
(1993). 
B. Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration: The sole issue before the Court is Walco's 
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's oral ruling that it would dismiss Wal co' s Complaint. 
Such a reconsideration motion can succeed if there are new facts or if the Court did not properly 
apply the law. 
No new facts are adduced. 
Walco does misstate one important fact in its Motion for Reconsideration dated December 
31, 2013. It asserts that Simmons knew of the Walco proposal before the first public discussion 
20 
of that proposal on October 15, 2012. This assertion is directly contradicted by Marietta Holman, 
21 Walco's manager. See, the Deposition Transcript of Marietta Holman, p. 32, 11. 20-25 and p. 33, 
22 11. 1-6. Her testimony relevant to this issue is quoted, in full, below. 
23 Walco' s efforts on this point underscore how critical it is that Simmons acquired the Walco 
24 information only after Walco chose, for reasons of its own, to make that information public without 
25 
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request for protection and without reservations as to its use. Other than this one 
mischaracterization (or at least misstatement) of fact, Walco asserts no additional facts, but instead 
relies on a re-argument of the legal issues presented at oral argument. 
Since Walco chose to file its motion before the Court issued a ·written opinion, the parties 
do not have the benefit of the Court's analysis of its ruling and can only respond to the arguments 
7 made by Walco. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Idaho County has briefed and argued the motion, and Simmons joins in those arguments. 
However, there is one issue where Simmons is situated differently than the County. 
The Court determined, inter alia, that Simmons could not be liable to Walco because 
Walco's own actions (not claiming privilege and openly airing its competing proposal) estop it 
from making Simmons liable for subsequently acquiring information that Walco itself made public 
for its own tactical advantage. 
This makes the issue of estoppel particularly germane to Simmons and that issue will be 
16 the focus of the following briefing and argument. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Simmons urges the Court to conclude that its decision is well-founded in fact and proper 
under applicable law. 
II. 
TIMELINE 
The sequence of material events is critical and all facts material to resolution of the claim 
against Simmons are both undisputed and dispositive. 
The critical time period in this matter was from September 11, 2012 to January 4, 2013: 
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September 11, 2012 
October 12, 2012 
October 15, 2012 
October 16, 2012 
and October 23, 
2012 
November 30, 2012 
January 1, 2013 
January 14, 2013 
March 25, 2013 
November 5, 2013 
November 29, 2013 
The County publishes its Request for Proposals RFP) 
Walco and Simmons respond to the RFP. Walco's submission is 
in a sealed envelope. 
Walco (not Simmons) appears at a public hearing where the 
competing proposals are made public. 
Two more public hearings where the competing proposals were 
publicly discussed. Simmons did participate in those public 
hearings to defend its proposal and met the demands and 
answered the questions posed to it by the County 
Commissioners. W alco participated and argued the merits of its 
proposal and attempted to show that its proposal was superior to 
Simmons. 
Simmons and Idaho County finalize the contract. 
The Simmons and Idaho County contract becomes effective. 
Walco files its tort claim and, for the first time, claimed that some 
then-unidentified part ofits proposal was a trade secret. This tort 
claim was amended by another filing dated January 7, 2013, but 
this did not differ in an material way from the earlier filing. 
Walco filed the Complaint in this matter asserting a trade secret 
claim but does not identify the trade secret. 
Marietta Holman is deposed and claims the entire proposal by 
W alco is a trade secret. 
For the first time, Walco identified the actual proposal amount as 
the trade secret. Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to County of 
Idaho 's and Simmons' Motions for Summary Judgment, . 7-8. 
III. 
WALCO'S ARGUMENT AND SUMMARY OF SIMMONS RESPONSE 
A. Walco' s Argument Admits that It Made Its Proposal Public for Its Own Purposes. 
To avoid mischaracterizing Walco's short argument on this issue, they state: 
This Court decided that even if a bid could be a trade secret, the fact 
that Walco discussed its bid during public meetings estops Walco 
from making any misappropriation claims. But such a contention 
overlooks several salient facts. For one, the record proves that 
before Walco discussed the bids at public meetings, Skip Brandt had 
already secretly discussed the specifics of the Walco bid with 
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Simmons. The day the bids were opened, the only bidder present at 
the meeting was Walco. 
Second. Walco's attempts to mitigate damages should not operate 
to estop it from claiming trade secret misappropriation. Six minutes 
into the meeting where the County first opened bids, the County had 
decided that Walco' s bid was not compliant with the proposal terms 
and was the losing bid. Walco reacted by asserting the ways in 
which the Simmons bid appeared to be incomplete and how it was 
quite likely that Walco's bid was the lower of the two bids. Walco 
had a duty to try and mitigate the damages it believed it was about 
to suffer. One commissioner immediately disqualified Walco for 
not submitting a bid that tracked the exact language of the proposed 
contract while calling the other bid compliant even though it 
suffered defects that were far worse. Walco, over the course of 
several meetings, attempted to demonstrate that its' bid was in fact 
compliant and that the other was not. Thus, because Walco did all 
it could to mitigate its' damages, in a manner consistent with law, it 
should not be estopped from pursuing a damages claim because 
those efforts failed. What is very important to consider here is the 
fact that unbeknownst to Walco, while it was working to point out 
that it was compliant and the process was skewed in favor of 
Simmons, is the fact that Simmons already knew everything that 
Walco was discussing as it had been shared with him by Skip Brandt 
the day the bids were opened. (Emphasis added.) 
16 See, Plaintfff's Motion to Reconsider Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
11-12. 
As discussed above ( and more fully below), the first paragraph of Wal co' s argument asserts 
facts directly contrary to the testimony ofWalco's manager. The sworn testimony of the manager 
should control over the unsupported assertions of counsel. 
The second paragraph characterizes Walco's actions as an effort to "mitigate damages" 
caused by alleged bad conduct by the County. 
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This assertion admits that Walco made a strategic choice. It chose to seek advantage by 
making its proposal, in all essential terms including the price, public. It also admits that the W alco 
tactic included no effort to identify or seek protection for any such asserted protectable 
information. When Walco chose this tactic, the necessary corollary is that they failed to identify 
or maintain their proposal as a protectable trade secret. Despite having failed to maintain the 
information as secret, they now belatedly attempt to make Simmons liable for information only 
acquired by Simmons of what Walco admits it made public. 
It also effectively concedes that Simmons was. given no express notice ofWalco's intention 
to keep information secret or any contract, relationship or notice to Simmons that could 
theoretically impose a duty on Simmons to keep the information secret. 
B. Summary of Simmons' Argument. There are several ways that this leaves Walco . 
14 with no basis for a claim against Simmons. 
15 First, the decision to publicly air all details of its proposal is almost precisely the opposite 
16 of the requirement that a party seeking to protect a trade secret takes to maintain its secrecy. 
17 
18 
19 
Simmons had no part in this. This decision by Walco to 'go public', whether right or wrong as to 
the County, certainly gave Simmons no reason to know that Walco intended to keep secret what it 
expressly made public. 
20 
21 Second, Simmons acted in reliance on the fact that Walco made its proposal public as it 
22 engaged in open, public and mutual discussions of the competing proposals. 
23 
24 
25 
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Finally, Walco made its competing proposal public for its own reasons and as an attempt 
to gain the advantage in public contract negotiations and, therefore, is estopped from making a 
claim against Simmons for information that Walco allowed to be made public. 
IV. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. Material Undisputed Facts Show No Basis to Impose a Duty On Simmons To Keep 
Walco' s Competing Proposal In Confidence. 
1. Simmons Had No Knowledge of the Walco Proposal Until after Walco 
Chose to Make Its Proposal Public. Walco's own testimony concedes that Simmons did 
not know of the Walco proposal until Walco made it public. 
Marietta Holman, manager of Walco, testified as follows: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
And did you assume that that discussion had taken 
place on October 15th or prior to that? 
I had a feeling that it did. 
Yes. 
Not prior to the 15th? 
Not prior to the 15th, no. 
And your assumption is based on your understanding 
or belief as to the relationship between Mr. Brandt 
and Mr. Simmons. 
Yes. 
See, the Deposition Transcript of Marietta Holman, p. 32, 11. 20-25 and p. 33, 11. 1-6. 
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Despite this testimony, Walco argues: 
For one, the record proves that before Walco discussed the 
bids at public meetings, Skip Brandt had already secretly 
discussed the specifics of the Walco bid with Simmons. 
See, Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Granting Defendants' lvfotion for Summary 
Judgment, pp. 11. 
Walco cannot create a dispute of fact by disagreeing with itself. It asserts, correctly, 
that the Walco proposal was made public on October 15, 2012, then argues, incorrectly, 
that Simmons knew of the WaJco proposal" ... before Walco discussed the bids at public 
meetings ... " Id. 
The testimony of Marietta Holman, under oath, and not the arguments of counsel, 
should control this issue. 
2. Walco Admits It Made Its Proposal Public to Seek Advantage in Winning 
the Contract from Idaho County. Walco goes on to argue that in the public meeting of 
October 15, 2012: 
The day the bids were opened [October 15, 2012], the only 
bidder at the meeting was Walco. 1 
Six minutes into the meeting where the County first opened 
the bids, the County had decided that Wal co' s bid was not 
compliant with the proposal terms and was the losing bid. 
1 This is a roundabout way of saying that no representative of Simmons was at the public meeting where the details 
of the Walco proposal were made public by Walco. 
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As a result, Walco made a decision, at the meeting of 
October 12, 2012 " ... to try and mitigate the damages it 
believed it was about to suffer .... " 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 12. 
Walco concedes that, beginning on October 15, 2012, it "reacted by asserting the 
ways in which the Simmons bid appeared to be incomplete and how it was quite likely that 
Walco' s bid was the lower of the two bids .... " Id. 
A review of the transcript of the October 15th meeting, supplied by Walco, shows 
Walco using its strategy of showing the superiority of its proposal by comparing the details 
of its proposal to what it argued was an inferior proposal by Simmons. During the course 
of this public meeting [October 15, 2012], the Commissioners asked about the salient 
details of the Walco proposal, and Walco, without reservation, answered, explained and 
argued for each term of their proposal. 
Wal co' s counsel assisted W alco in this process by demanding that all deliberations 
regarding the proposals be conducted in an open meeting and not in executive session. At 
one point, Simmons asked for an executive session to show how it had arrived at certain of 
its figures. Walco not only made no such request but vehemently demanded that all 
information be discussed in a public forum: 
Walco submitted all of this information and it was opened 
for all to see. Why is Mr. Simmons allowed to share 
information in secret that Walco was required to expose to 
the public? If the current plan is allowed, Simmons will be 
permitted, in a non public manner, to undercut Walco since, 
as I will point out below, Simmons bid is actually higher than 
the one submitted by Walco. This is patently unfair and it 
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sure to be viewed very critically by a court if the cun-ent plan 
is can-ied out as intended. Thus, Walco respectfully requests 
that the commission abandon the illegal idea to conduct an 
executive session and give Simmons an unfair advantage in 
this bid process. (Emphasis added.) 
See, the Letter from Dennis Charney to Kirk MacGregor and the Idaho County 
Commissioners dated October 22, 2012, p. 2, attached as Exhibit Oto the Declaration of 
Kathy M Ackerman, dated September 27, 2013. 
Walco went on further by stating: 
First, we are pleased that the commission agreed that an 
executive session was not an appropriate forum to discuss 
the expenditure of taxpayer funds. Thank you for making 
this change. We trust that all future meetings regarding this 
contract will be open and transparent so this issue will not 
need to be revisited. (Emphasis added.) 
See, the Letter from Dennis Charney to Kirk MacGregor and the Idaho County 
Commissioners dated October 26, 2012, p. 1, attached as Exhibit YY to the Third 
Supplemental Declaration a/Kathy M Ackerman dated December 6, 2013. 
Both letters excoriated Idaho County, and made personal allegations against one of 
the Commissioners. 
However, no letter was sent to Simmons and nothing was done to Walco to put 
Simmons on notice that any sort of trade secret claim might even be possible. 
Walco' s chief demand through the 26th was that the Commissioners make both 
proposals public. From that point forward, as Mr. Charney's letter concedes, the proposals 
were "opened for all to see." Mr. Charney went on to iss:ue a rare compliment to the 
Commissioners for discussing the competing proposals in open meetings. 
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All-in-all, there was a full throated and vigorous discussion of the competing 
proposals-and not a word was said by Walco regarding the fact that some part of what 
they were so vehemently arguing was a secret. Every detail of the proposal was argued 
over, explained and clarified, and all in public as demanded by Walco. 
B. Walco First Claimed A Trade Secret Only After Simmons Was Awarded The 
Contract In November of 2012. After the contract was awarded to Simmons, and after the contract 
with Simmons went into effect on January 1, 2013, Walco filed its notice of tort claim (on January 
4, 2013 and amended on January 7, 2013). 
The tort claims were the first time that Walco made the claim that some portion of its 
proposal was private. 
Simmons received a copy of the Notice of Tort Claim after January 24, 2013. There is no 
evidence that Simmons knew of any claim of secret or proprietary information prior to that time. 
The contract had already been awarded and was in force prior to the time Simmons knew even that 
Walco claimed it was proprietary, making it undisputed that Simmons had no opportunity to use 
information that it knew was proprietary or even that it knew it was claimed to be proprietary prior 
to the award of the contract. 
The foregoing are the undisputed facts. It is fair to review these facts and conclude that 
Walco did not have any intent to claim anything as secret in the October contracting process-
22 there is certainly no evidence that they made such a claim of secrecy until after the contract was 
23 negotiated and concluded by Simmons and Idaho County. 
24 
25 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Walco argues that it reacted to perceived irregularities in the RFP process by choosing to 
make its proposal public. Motive on their part is not relevant. The fact is the information was 
made public for Walco' s own purposes. 
Simmons is accused of no irregularity and ofno wrongful act save exposure to information 
Walco made public. Walco cites no authority that would make an acquisition of public information 
7 wrongful. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
C. Walco Is Estopped from Claiming as Private What it Made Public. Walco cites no 
authority, and Simmons can find none, that a competitor participating in an uncensored, open, and 
public discussion with another competitor can be somehow charged with a duty to keep 
confidential and make no use of the openly discussed information. 
This Court in its oral ruling found that Simmons is privileged to acquire information that 
Walco made public. The express legal authority for this is found at Comment d to Restatement 
(First) of Torts§ 757. d. Privilege: "A privilege to disclose or use another's trade secret may arise 
from the other's consent or from other conduct on his part by which he is estopped from 
complaining ... " Id. 
Walco, having failed to win the contract by making its proposal unreservedly public, wants 
to reverse course and claim that Simmons was acting wrongly in participating in the very course 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
of conduct that Walco demanded that the Commissioners follow. 
There is no legal support cited by Walco for such a claim against Simmons. Simmons 
could find no case where such a claim had been brought. 
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As the County effectively argues, Walco fails to identify a trade secret as defined in Idaho 
law or, in the alternative, that if some secret information might have been in the Walco proposal, 
that Walco failed to identify and maintain that secret information sufficiently to burden the County 
5 with a duty to maintain information as confidential. 
6 However, assume for purposes of argument that Walco decided to react to perceived 
7 irregularities in the process by making its proposal unreservedly public. The fact is that Simmons 
8 had no part in the perceived irregularities and no reason or basis to know that what was made 
9 
10 
1 1 
public would later be claimed to be secret. 
The law has a succinct way of expressing a similar concept in the case of judicial estoppel. 
Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position and then 
12 
13 seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. See, Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 
14 232, 178 P .3d 597 (2007). While judicial estoppels is not directly applicable, the policy underlying 
15 that judicial principal is applicable. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Idaho adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 277 P .2d 
561 (1954). Judicial estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking one position, then 
subsequently seeking a second position that is incompatible with the first. A & J Const. Co. v. 
Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684, 116 P.3d 12, 14 (2005). The policy behind judicial estoppel is to 
protect "the integrity of the judicial system, by protecting the orderly administration of justice and 
22 having regard for the dignity of the judicial proceeding." Id. at 685, 116 P.3d at 
23 15 (quoting Robertson Supply Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99, 101, 952 P.2d 914, 916 
24 (Ct.App.1998)). Broadly accepted, it is intended to prevent parties from playing fast and loose 
25 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
with the legal system. See, AfcCallister v. Blackfoot Medical Center, 154 Idaho 891,303 P.3d 578 
(2013). 
The broader doctrine of estoppel shows that purpose is to deny rewards from those who 
seek to take advantage be taking inconsistent positions. In its broadest sense, equitable estoppel 
is a means of preventing a party from asserting a legal claim or defense that is contrary or 
7 inconsistent with his or her prior action or conduct. Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, 
8 
9 
10 
11 
certain conduct by a party is viewed as being so offensive that it precludes the party from later 
asserting a claim or defense that would otherwise be meritorious; in other words, it serves to offset 
the benefit that the offending party would otherwise derive from the conduct. Equitable estoppel 
prevents a party from asserting rights when his or her own conduct renders that assertion contrary 
12 
13 
14 
15 
to equity and good conscience. 28 Am.Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver§ 27. (Footnotes omitted.) 
Walco's actions fits this pattern nearly perfectly. 
If the hearing on October 15th was not sufficient, then a careful reading of the transcripts 
16 of the October 16th and October 23 rd meetings makes it even more clear that Walco unreservedly 
17 
discussed its proposal. See, Exhibits E and F to the Supplemental Declaration of Counsel dated 
18 
19 
20 
21 
November 15, 2013, filed herein. 
It is unreasonable to conclude that Simmons could have possibly known that Walco 
intended all this information, or even some ofit, to be confidential given \Valco's own behavior at 
22 the public meetings of October 15th, 16th, and 23 rd. 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Without such knowledge, and with no other basis for imposing a duty on Simmons, there 
can be no legal basis to impose such a duty and burden on Simmons. 
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V. 
CONCLUSION 
The Comi should dismiss Count I based on the logic expressed in the holding that, "Under 
5 Idaho law, it is factually impossible for a party to tortiously interfere with that party's own 
6 contract." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 844, 243 P.3d 642, 660 (2010), citing Ostrander 
7 v. Farm Bureau Mut'l Ins. Co. of Idaho, Inc. 123 Idaho 650, 654, 851 P.2d 946, 950 (1993). 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Similarly, the Court should dismiss Count II because a party cannot publicly disclose 
allegedly protectable information and then sue those who acquired the very information made 
public. 
Walco' s motion for reconsideration should be denied. 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2014. 
RISLEY LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
Attorney for Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc. 
,,:::,;:/ 
/// /// 
/):?/'/ 
,/&'/ 
By:_..:..?_P_i/1_,. ____________ _ 
DAVID R. RISLEY 
ISB NO. 1789 
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Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
W ALCO, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho; 
and 
SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S RESPONSE 
TO WALCO'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT -1-
Case No. CV-2013-42360 
DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S 
RESPONSE TO WALCO'S MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER GRANT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Walco's seeks reconsideration because it argues (I) a bid can constitute a trade 
secret under Idaho's statute; (2) a rational jury could conclude Walco made reasonable 
efforts to maintain the secrecy of its allegedly proprietary information; and (3) Walco is 
not estopped from claiming misappropriation, which only a jury can determine. (Pl.' s 
Mot. to Recons., at 2.) 
Walco's motion should be denied for several reasons. None of the cases Walco 
cites changes the relevant legal analysis in this case. This Court need not decide if a bid 
or RFP response can ever constitute a trade secret under Idaho law. Rather, the Court can 
grant summary judgment based solely on Walco's failure to maintain the secrecy of its 
information. Courts in several Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA") jurisdictions 
routinely grant summary judgment on this element alone. And, as Simmons Sanitation 
Service, Inc.' s response brief ably argues, Walco has provided no new facts or law to 
change the Court's estoppel analysis. 
It bears emphasis that Walco resorts to misstating a pivotal fact when it asserts that 
"the record proves that" Slap Brandt revealed Walco's information to Robert Simmons 
"before Walco discussed the bids at public meetings." (Pl. 's Mot. to Recons., at 11 
(italics in original).) The record proves exactly the opposite: Skip Brandt's phone calls 
with Robert Simmons occurred after the Commissioners' meeting at 3:00 p.m. on 
October 15, 2012 - which Walco has already twice conceded was a public meeting and 
at which Walco freely discussed its allegedly proprietary information. 
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Walco provides no basis for reconsideration. rhe Court should deny Walco' s 
motion and enter judgment for Idaho County on all of Walco' s claims. 
II. ARGUMENT 
Walco' s cases do not support reconsideration. W alco failed to meet the statutory 
element of maintaining the secrecy of its allegedly proprietary information. On this basis 
alone, the Court should grant summary judgment. For this reason, the Court need not 
decide if a bid can ever constitute a trade secret. 
A. The Cases Walco Cites Do Not Justify Reconsideration. 
Walco relies on five trade secrets cases in seeking reconsideration. None of them 
supports Walco either on reconsideration or on the merits. 
1. Walco's Bid Is Not Presumptively a Trade Secret. 
Walco cites two cases for the proposition that an RFP response or bid can 
constitute a trade secret. (See Pl.'s Mot. to Recons., at 6-7.) Walco's two cases involve 
bids to private entities on private contracts, not to public entities on public contracts, and 
the cases involve the theft of bid information before bids were turned in, not after they 
were made public with the plaintiffs' consent. See CDC Restoration & Constr., LC v. 
Tradesmen Contractors, LLC, 274 P.3d 317, 321-22 ,r,r 2-5, 327-28 il 35 (Utah Ct. App. 
2012); Ovation Plumbing, Inc. v. Furton, 33 P.3d 1221, 1223 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). 
Neither case addresses Idaho law or Walco's facts. 
In CDC Restoration, the same person helped two parties develop their bids before 
either was submitted, plainly using information that was private because not yet publicly 
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disclosed at the time he used it. See CDC Restoration,_ 274 P.3d at 321-22 15, 327-28 
,r 35. Regardless, the Utah appeals court went out of its way to note that no party had 
questioned whether the bid at issue could constitute a trade secret - and the court 
specifically held that the defendant could raise the issue on remand. See CDC 
Restoration, 274 P.3d at 333 161 & n.7. The Court did not, as Walco falsely claims, 
"simply clarif[y] that it did" constitute a trade secret. (See Pl.'s Mot. to Recons., at 7.) 
Ovation Plumbing arose under Colorado law, which specifically includes in its 
definition of a trade secret "confidential business or financial information" of the kind 
formerly protected by the Restatement (First) of Torts § 759 (1939). See Ovation 
Plumbing, 33 P.3d. at 1223-24. As Idaho County has previously noted, § 759 addressed 
a non-trade secrets common law action for "Procuring Information by Improper Means." 
Colorado's statute specifically incorporates that broader language in its definition of a 
trade secret, which Idaho does not. 1 
1 Colorado's definition is structured differently from and is broader than the UTSA's and 
Idaho's definition. A "trade secret" is 
the whole or any portion or phase of any scientific or technical infonnation, 
design, process, procedure, fonnula, improvement, confidential business or 
financial information, ... or other information relating to any business or 
profession which is secret and of value. To be a "trade secret" the owner 
thereof must have taken measures to prevent the secret from becoming 
available to persons other than those selected by the owner to have access 
thereto for limited purposes. 
Ovation Plumbing, 33 P.3d at 1223-24 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7-74-102(4) (2000)) 
(ellipses in original) (underline added). 
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Neither of these cases entitles Walco to a pres1.pnption that an RFP response or a 
bid is a trade secret. Neither requires any change to the Court's analysis. 
2. Walco Is Not Entitled To A Jury Trial. 
Walco cites two cases for the truism that "in many cases" the existence of a trade_ 
secret is "elusive" and is "ordinarily" a question for a jury. (See Pl.' s Mot. to Recons., at 
11.) Neither of these cases is relevant to Walco's case. 
In one case the lower court was reversed because it inexplicably dismissed several 
non-trade secrets claims just because it found the plaintiff had not proven the existence of 
a trade secret - a decision it reached on admittedly disputed facts that had not been 
tested in depositions. See Kaib 's Roving R.PH Agency, Inc. v. Smith, 239 P.3d 247, 249-
51 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). 
In the second case, the Seventh Circuit reviewed a trial court's reversal of a jury 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff against a defendant that violated an oral confidentiality 
agreement - so the standard of review was far different than on summary judgment. See 
Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 725-26 & n.4 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
Regardless, m 2012, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Learning Curve and 
affirmed summary judgment on the UTSA element of failure to maintain secrecy. See 
Fail-Sofe, LLC v. A.O. Smith Corp., 674 F.3d 889, 893-94 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying 
Wisconsin's UTSA statute). 
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Nearly all trade secrets cases have distinct facts, of course, but Fail-Safe 
practically describes Walco's case: 
Id 
None of the information provided by FS to AOS was marked confidential, 
nor did FS make it known that it expected this information to remain 
confidential. Rather, FS volunteered information and willingly cooperated 
with AOS. 
The Fail-Safe court even observed, like this Court did at the December 20, 2013 
hearing, that the defendant took steps to prevent disclosure of its secret information -
efforts the plaintiff did not take: 
Id 
Indeed, FS signed AOS' s one-way confidentiality agreement, yet failed to 
obtain similar protection . . . . FS failed to make a modicum of effort to 
protect the confidentiality of its information, a failure that was not 
reasonable under these circumstances. 
Neither of Walco's cases requires this Court to submit Walco's case to a jury. 
3. Circumstantial Evidence Is Irrelevant in This Case. 
Lastly, Walco cites a Utah case for the truism that a Jury can infer 
misappropriation from circumstantial evidence. (See Pl.' s Mot. to Recons., at 11 ( citing 
USA Power, LLC v. Pac[fiCorp, 235 P.3d 749 (Utah 2010).) This much is true, but it is 
irrelevant under Idaho law when the plaintiff has not first proved the existence of a trade 
secret: "Without a proven trade secret there can be no misappropriation, even if the 
defendants' action was wrongful." Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 734, 992 
P.2d 175, 183 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Indeed, in the other Utah case Walco cites, t~e court made clear that a trade secret 
is never presumed to exist and cannot simply be inferred from use alone, because this 
would collapse the separate statutory analyses of existence and misappropriation ( or 
"injurious use"). See CDC Restoration, 274 P.3d at 324-25. In that same case, the court 
reversed summary judgment on misappropriation but went out of its way to note that the 
court below had simply assumed the existence of a trade secret and that the defendant 
could on remand challenge such existence if it wished to. See id. at 333161 & n.7. 
More relevant to this Court's consideration of Walco's misappropriation argument 
is the Idaho Supreme Court's review of a summary judgment ruling in another trade 
secrets case. In Northwest Bee-Corp v. Home Living Service, 136 Idaho 835, 41 P.3d 263 
(2002), the Court affirmed summary judgment on the factually disputed element of actual 
misappropriation even where the trade secret was already proved to exist. See id. at 839, 
41 P.3d at 267. 
The Court first observed that "[t]he nonmoving party must submit more than just 
conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to establish a genuine issue." 
Id. The Court analyzed the purportedly disputed evidence of misappropriation and 
agreed that the plaintiff had not met its evidentiary burden to survive summary judgment. 
See id. at 839-40, 41 P.3d at 267-68. 
Idaho law does not require this Court to submit Walco's claim to a jury. None of 
Walco's cases changes this Court's correct analysis of Walco's trade secrets claim. 
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Wako Did Not Maintain the Secre~y of Its Information. 
Walco again asserts that its June 7, 2012 letter and sealing the envelope containing 
its RFP response were sufficient efforts. (See Pl.' s Mot. to Recons., at 8-11.) And 
Walco attempts to argue a completely new fact that is not in the record: that Walco 
"reasonably expected that its bid information would be kept secret, at least until all bids 
were complete." (Id. at 9.) 
Under Idaho's statute, a "trade secret" does not exist unless the plaintiff made 
"efforts" to "maintain" the secrecy of its allegedly proprietary information. Idaho Code 
§ 48-801(5)(b) (emphasis added). To "maintain" something requires ongoing action: to 
"continue [it] without changing" or to "to keep [it] in an existing state (as of repair, 
efficiency, or validity)" or to "preserve [it] from failure or decline." See Merriam-
Webster Dictionary (emphases added), available at http://www.merriam-
we bster .com/ dictionary /maintain. 
Idaho County agrees that these definitions do not require Walco' s "continuous 
use" of its alleged trade secrets in its ongoing business - but they certainly required 
Walco to continue, keep, or preserve the secrecy of its infonnation: 
Failure to take reasonable steps to prevent gratuitous disclosure of the 
alleged trade secret forfeits any protection. Though absolute secrecy is not 
required, one who claims a trade secret must exercise eternal vigilance in 
protecting its confidentiality. 
Fail-Safe, 674 F.3d at 893 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
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1. Walco's Letter and Sealed Ei:ivelope Were Insufficient. 
First, Walco again overstates the content of its June 7, 2012 letter when it asserts 
the letter "request[ed] that all of Walco's information with regard to the bidding process 
be treated as exempt under the Public Records Act." (Pl. 's Mot. to Recons., at 9 
( emphasis added).) 
At the December 20 hearing, Idaho County understood the Court to reject this 
counterfactual and post hoc attempt to focus the vague request made by W alco' s letter. It 
still should. Walco's June 7 letter does not specify any information Walco asserted was a 
trade secret, much less an RFP response that did not then exist and would not exist for 
four months. 
Second, Walco's sealed envelope protected nothing. All the arguments on this 
issue that Idaho County made in its summary judgment reply continue to apply, and 
Idaho County incorporates them herein without repeating them. 
· Walco's sealed envelope contained no restrictive legend whatsoever. It was 
submitted to a public entity on a public contract with Walco's knowledge it would be 
opened in a public meeting it knew to attend at 3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012. The 
sealing of the envelope with no further effort is meaningless. Walco has provided no fact 
or law to change this conclusion. 
2. Walco's Newest Argument Is Inadmissible and Incredible. 
Walco asserts for the first time on reconsideration - with no factual basis in or 
citation to the record before this Court - that Walco "reasonably expected that its bid 
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information would be kept secret, at least until fill bids were complete," based in part on 
language in the RFP. (See Pl.'s Mot. to Recons., at 9.) 
a. This factual assertion is not in the record 
Walco noted that it was not required to, and chose not to, provide any new 
affidavits in support of its motion for reconsideration. (Pl.' s Mot. to Recons., at 3.) 
Walco's new assertion regarding what it "reasonably expected" is a factual assertion of 
its counsel by way of argument in a brief not verified by any party with personal 
knowledge of Walco's expectation when it submitted its proposal on October 12, 2012. 
It is not a fact in any affidavit, and it is not a fact proffered or tested in deposition. 
This baseless factual assertion should not be considered by the Court: "Upon a 
motion for summary judgment a court will consider only that material contained in 
affidavits or depositions which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be 
admissible at trial." Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 869, 452 P.2d 
362, 366 (1969) (emphasis added); see also Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 271, 
272, 281 P.3d 103, 108, 109 (2012) (citing Petricevich twice for the fundamental 
proposition that "in order to withstand summary judgment, the plaintiff must present 
sufficient evidence upon which a jury could rely" and cannot rely on "their own 
conclusory assertion[s]"). 
As Idaho County has repeatedly demonstrated in its briefing, Walco has 
throughout this litigation asserted facts not in the record and failed to cite to the record 
for material facts. For example, Idaho County has already requested, and continues to 
DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S RESPONSE 
TO W ALCO' S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT -10-
I ,· 
' 
request, that the Court not rely on Walco' s nmperous deposition excerpts without ruling 
on the many objections interposed (and omitted from some of Waico's quotations of 
those excerpts). 
The Court should disallow \Valco's latest attempt to assert a fact without a proper 
basis. It is too late for Walco to assert this new factual basis, because any affidavit in 
support of reconsideration was required to be filed at the time Walco filed its motion. 
See I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(B). 
b. Walco 's claim is contradicted by its own actions. 
If any event, Walco's newest post hoc argument is completely incredible for at 
least four reasons. First, if it were true, Walco would have proffered this fact to 
contradict Idaho County's assertion that on September 11, 2012 the County announced 
that the proposals would be opened and discussed in public on October 15 and October 
16. (See Def. Idaho County's Am. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (Oct. 31, 2013), 
at 3-4 (citing Ackerman Deel. ,i 5; Brandt Deel. ,i 4; Chmelik Deel. ,i 4; Rockwell Deel. 
,r 4).) 
Second, the language of the RFP twice says that Idaho County "may" follow the 
procedures Walco now says relieved it of its statutory obligation to maintain the secrecy 
of its information. (See Ackerman Deel. (Sept. 27, 2013) Ex. J, at J.019.) The County 
never promised the procedures Walco relies on. So any reliance was in fact unreasonable 
- especially with regard to information Walco believed to constitute trade secrets -
until Walco confirmed the process the County would actually use. 
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Third, any such "reasonable expectati~n," if it existed, was quickly destroyed at 
3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012, when Walco: (a) knew where and when to show up for a 
public Commissioners' meeting; (b) participated without objection as Walco's and 
Simmons' proposals were opened and the parties' base rates were announced; 
( c) watched for several minutes as the Commissioners reviewed the proposals; and 
( d) freely answered questions and volunteered information about its own proposal. 
Walco did not before or at that meeting inquire about the process being used, such 
as by asking: Why was its proposal just opened and announced publicly? What is going 
to be discussed the next day at the public Commissioners' meeting? Why isn't this all 
being done in private? 
Fourth, Walco's suggestion that any other RFP response was not "complete" is a 
straw man argument intended to obscure the fact that Walco, not the Defendants, threw a 
wrench in the RFP process. 
No fact in the record suggests that anyone viewed Walco's RFP response until it 
was opened in public. So there can be no genuine dispute as to the following fact: Before 
3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012, Walco was the only party that knew its RFP response 
rejected Idaho County's key pricing terms and instead proposed a dramatic departure 
from Idaho County's, Walco's, and Simmons' years-old variable pricing structure. 
Only Walco could have known that other proposers who complied with Idaho 
County's requested variable pricing structure would immediately learn of Walco's very 
different invariable and annually increasing pricing structure. Only W alco could have 
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t 
known that its pricing would render other re~ponders' fuel surcharge estimates as relevant 
as Walco insisted those estimates were during the time Walco sought to discredit 
Simmons' proposal.2 
Yet Walco did nothing whatsoever to prevent the public opening and discussion of 
its proposal containing its refonnulated pricing structure. There is thus no way that 
Walco's efforts could have been reasonable as a matter of law to protect the "secrecy" of 
its information. Walco's failure is fatal to its claim as a matter of law: 
Failure to take reasonable steps to prevent gratuitous disclosure of the 
alleged trade secret forfeits any protection. Though absolute secrecy is not 
required, one who claims a trade secret must exercise eternal vigilance in 
protecting its confidentiality. 
Fail-Safe, 674 F.3d at 893 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted) 
( emphasis added). 
Walco's newest unsubstantiated factual assertion, even if admissible, is 
insufficient to warrant reconsideration of the Court's conclusion that Walco failed to 
maintain the secrecy of its information. 
2 Idaho County does not concede that fuel surcharge estimates were nearly as relevant as 
Walco insists - because nothing changes the fact that only Walco proposed an 
invariable 5% annual, compounding, automatic base rate increase. This pricing element 
alone rendered irrelevant the small variations in fuel surcharges under the historical 
pricing structure. Even if Simmons had used Walco's information, no reasonable juror 
could conclude that Walco was damaged, because no reasonable juror could conclude 
that Consumer Price Index-based increases would consistently outpace Walco's 5% 
annual increases. 
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3. Walco Was Not Mitigating Damages On and After October 16. 
2012. 
Walco argued for the first time at the December 20, 2013 hearing, and repeats in 
its motion for reconsideration, that its unqualified discussion of its RFP response on and 
after October 16, 2012, was merely to mitigate damages from the disclosure of its trade 
secrets. (See Pl.'s Mot. to Recons., at 12.) This argument is absurd and completely 
unsupported by any authority. 
As decades of trade secrets law and modern statutes suggest, holders of trade 
secrets mitigate damages by seeking injunctions to prevent further disclosure or damage. 
They do not mitigate damages by speaking freely about their trade secrets in successive 
public meetings. 
The Court should again reject this argument, as it necessarily did by its ruling at 
the December 20, 2013 hearing. 
4. Case law from UTSA jurisdictions amply supports the Court's 
ruling. 
Walco' s brief insinuates that the Court is out on a limb to dispose of a trade secrets 
case on summary judgment. The Court is in fact in exceptionally good company across 
UTSA jurisdictions. 
For example, m an Idaho trade secrets case, Judge Winmill likewise granted 
summary judgment because the plaintiff "failed to protect the information" by having 
shared it "without any restriction." Sitco, Inc. v. Agco Corp., No. CV-05-073-EBL W, 
2006 WL 908065, at* 1-2 (D. Idaho April 7, 2006). 
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And, as discussed below, courts m other UTSA jurisdictions routinely grant 
summary judgment on the same UTSA element found in Idaho's statute requiring efforts 
to maintain secrecy. A few of the more relevant cases are discussed below. 
a. Georgia 
In a Georgia UTSA case, the court first held it is a question of fact whether 
information constituted a trade secret, and then analyzed several pieces of information 
claimed as trade secrets and granted summary judgment as to several because of the 
plaintiffs failure to maintain the secrecy of the information. See Diamond Power Int'l, 
Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1332-37 (N.D. Ga. 2007). 
The information held not to constitute trade secrets had been the subject of far 
more efforts than Walco's: the court deemed confidentiality agreements, password 
protection, and other affirmative measures insufficient under the circumstances. See, 
e.g., id. at 1335. 
The court noted, as relevant here, "Information that has been publicly disclosed, 
such as through the sale or disclosure to customers, is not protected by the [Georgia 
Trade Secrets Act]. Because the information has been placed into the public domain, any 
reasonable expectation of secrecy is destroyed." Id. at 1332-33 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also AmeriGas Propane, L.P. v. T-Bo Propane, Inc., 972 F. 
Supp. 685 (S.D. Ga. 1997) (granting summary judgment because "Plaintiff has failed to 
proffer evidence that it took reasonable efforts to secure the secrecy of the information"). 
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Georgia state courts have also gr,anted summary judgment on the same statutory 
element at issue here. See Stargate Software Int 'l, Inc. v. Rumph, 482 S.E.2d 498, 502 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1997) ("As a matter of law, given the circumstances, Stargate's efforts 
were not reasonable to maintain secrecy of any trade secrets concerning the Rayonier 
projects."); Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Examination Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 453 S.E.2d 488, 493 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1994) ("Under the circumstances presented, Equifax failed to take 
reasonable steps to ... ensure the continuing secrecy of the information . . . . Therefore 
Equifax is not entitled to seek recovery under the specific provisions of the Trade Secrets 
Act.") 
b. Minnesota 
In a Minnesota case cited approvingly by the Idaho Supreme Court, the court 
overturned a trial court's finding of a trade secret because the plaintiff failed to maintain 
the secrecy of its infonnation as a matter of law. See Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled 
Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901-03 (Minn. 1983), cited in Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 
133 Idaho 726, 734, 992 P.2d 175, 183 (1999). Electro-Craft analyzed this statutory 
element at length in ways relevant to Walco's case. 
First, the court held that a plaintiffs intention to keep information secret 1s 
irrelevant to its efforts: 
The district court found that, even though ECC had no "meaningful security 
provisions," ECC showed an intention to keep its data and processes secret. 
This finding does not bear upon the statutory requirement that ECC use 
"efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain ... 
secrecy." 
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Eleciro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 901 (italiqs in original). 
Next, the court clarified that a holder of alleged trade secrets must demonstrate a 
"continuing course of conduct" not of using the trade secrets in business, see id., but in 
asserting and maintaining secrecy: 
We ack:now ledge that ECC took minimal precautions in screening its 
Handbook and publications for confidential information and by requiring 
some of its employees to sign a confidentiality agreement, but these were 
not enough. 
Id. at 901-02 (footnote omitted). 
Electro-Craft held that the plaintiffs "physical security measures" and 
"confidentiality" procedures were both "fatally lax," id. at 902, and that its confidentiality 
agreements were - like Walco's June 7 letter was - "too vague to apprise the 
employees of specific 'secrets,"' id. at 903. Because the plaintiff was not "ever 
consistent in treating the information here as secret," the court reversed the trial court's 
findings of fact as clearly erroneous. Id. 
Electro-Craft also noted that when information is not obviously a trade secret, the 
plaintiffs efforts to maintain secrecy are even more important: 
ECC's efforts were especially inadequate because of the nonintuitive nature 
of ECC's claimed secrets here. The dimensions, etc., of ECC's motors are 
not trade secrets in as obvious a way as a "secret fonnula" might be. ECC 
should have let its employees know in no uncertain terms that those 
features were secret. 
Id. at 902-03; see also Nordale, Inc. v. Samsco, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1263, 1274 (D. Minn. 
1993) ("Nordale's efforts were especially inadequate given the nature of its alleged 
secrets. The specifications and qualities of its product and its customer lists are not 
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obvious trade secrets."). An RFP resgonse that is pre-scheduled for public opening and 
discussion and submitted to a public agency on a public contract is not an obvious trade 
secret. 
Simmons' response briefly ably addresses the estoppel argument in this case. But 
Idaho County notes that Electro-Craft's analysis suggests that the UTSA's requirement 
that one take efforts to maintain secrecy to establish the existence of a trade secret 
effectively codifies the Restatement's common law estoppel defense. See Restatement 
(First) of Torts§ 757 (1939), cmt. d ("A privilege to disclose or use another's trade secret 
may arise from the other's consent or from other conduct on his part by which he is 
estopped from complaining."). 
Electro-Craft held that the plaintiff could not claim any confidential relationship 
with the party to which it had disclosed its trade secrets because it had failed to maintain 
secrecy: "ECC's failure to make reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy, discussed above, 
was fatal to its claim of a confidential relationship." Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 903. 
Given the definition in the UTSA (and Idaho law), these observations are 
essentially tautologies, because a disclosure, confidential or not, is not a disclosure of a 
trade secret at all if the information was not the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain 
secrecy. Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court captured this entire concept most succinctly in 
Basic American: "Without a proven trade secret there can be no misappropriation, even if 
the defendants' action was wrongful." Basic Am., 133 Idaho at 734, 992 P.2d at 183 
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(internal quotation marks omitted) .. The analysis under Idaho law is, first, establish a 
trade secret, and, second, consider misappropriation. 3 
All of this UTSA case law leads to the conclusion that Walco's actions at the 
October 15, 2012 meeting alone continue to be sufficient for this Court to hold that 
(1) W alco' s claim fails on the efforts to maintain secrecy prong of the Idaho statute; 
(2) Walco was estopped after that meeting from complaining about any use of its 
allegedly proprietary information; and (3) any reasonable expectation Walco may have 
had about the secrecy of the process failed to be reasonable when it did not inquire of the 
process being used or the status of its or Simmons' information after the public 
discussion of that infonnation at the October 15 meeting. 
Walco has no case in a UTSA jurisdiction like Idaho, no matter how many 
different ways it frames its argument. The Court remains on solid footing to hold that 
Walco failed as a matter of law to maintain the secrecy of its information and therefore 
can have no claim for misappropriation. 
3 This renders of questionable vitality, at least in Idaho, Electro-Craft's observation that 
"the concept of trade secret status and the concept of misappropriation should not be 
artificially separated." Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 903. The court first noted that it 
"technically need not reach the issue of whether misappropriation occurred," but chose to 
analyze it anyhow. See id. Basic American's analysis forecloses this approach under 
Idaho law. See also CDC Restoration, 274 P.3d at 324-25 (refusing to "create a 
presumption that trade secret status may be established by use alone" because this would 
"collapse" the separate statutory analyses of existence and misappropriation). 
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The Status of Bids Under the Restatement Is Irrelevant. 
all parties have acknowledged, the Idaho Supreme Court has relied on§ 757 of 
the Restatement (First) of Torts (1939), primarily for six factors sometimes useful to a 
trade secret analysis. See, e.g., Basic Am., 133 Idaho at 735, 992 P.2d at 184. For 
whatever reason, the Supreme Court has not endorsed the discussion of trade secrets in 
the modern Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (1995), other than to observe in a 
footnote in Basic American that the modern Restatement provides a broader definition of 
trade secrets than Idaho's statute. See id. at 735 n.2, 992 P.2d at 184 n.2. 
Idaho County's counsel did not appreciate that the Basic American footnote 
referred to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (1995) instead of the 
Restatement (First) of Torts (1939) referred to in the body of the Basic American opinion, 
or the undersigned counsel would have noted that distinction to the Court. 
But that distinction does not change the fact that, for whatever reason, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has endorsed reference to Restatement (First) of Torts § 757, and has, if 
anything, downplayed (by its Basic American footnote) the relevance of the modern 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (1995). The Idaho Supreme Court does not 
endorse the view that Idaho's statute is as expansive as the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition. 
Regardless, Idaho County continues to believe the statute controls this case. The 
Restatement is only at issue because Walco materially altered a quotation from the 
Restatement (First) of Torts to support the specious argument that "the amount of [a] bid 
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for a contract" has "long been res:ognized as trade secrets." (See PI. 's Opp'n to Mot. for 
Summ. J. (Nov. 29, 2013), at 7.) This was - and remains - a completely false claim.4 
Only because of Walco's false claim and materially altered quotation did Idaho 
County's reply brief even address whether a bid is a trade secret under the Restatement of 
Torts. The Restatement is ultimately irrelevant to Walco's claim, because Walco cannot 
meet its burden under a statutory element of its claim - i.e., Walco did not maintain the 
secrecy of its information. 
D. Walco Misstates a Pivotal Fact Without Record Citation. 
Walco resorts to misstating a pivotal fact in this case when it asserts that "the 
record proves that" Skip Brandt revealed Walco's infonnation to Robert Simmons 
"before Walco discussed the bids at public meetings." (Pl.'s Mot. to Recons., at 11 
4 As the Court may recall, Restatement (First) of Torts § 759 describes a completely 
separate, non-trade secrets common law action for "Procuring Information by Improper 
Means" that is purposefully broader than a trade secrets action under§ 757. A comment 
in§ 759 reads: 
Examples of infonnation, other than trade secrets, included in this Section 
are: the state of one's accounts, the amount of his bid for a contract, his 
sources of supply, his plans for expansion or retrenchment, and the like. 
There are no limitations as to the type of information included except that it 
relate to matters in his business. 
Restatement (First) of Torts § 759, cmt. b (1939). Walco materially altered this quote by 
using brackets and ellipses to suggest that it described trade secrets: 
Examples of [such] information ... include ... the state of one's accounts, 
the amount of his bid for a contract, his sources of supply, his plans for 
expansion or retrenchment, and the like. There are no limitations as to the 
type of information included except that it relate to [secret or confidential] 
matters in the business. 
(See Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. (Nov. 29, 2013), at 7 (alterations, ellipses, and 
underline in original).) 
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(italics in original).) Walco, as. it has done throughout this litigation, makes this claim 
without citation to the record - because no record fact could possibly support it. 
As Simmons' response brief ably argues, and Idaho County will not repeat, 
Walco's own testimony contradicts this assertion. Skip Brandt's phone calls with Robert 
Simmons occurred after the Commissioners' meeting at 3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012 
- which Walco has already twice conceded was a public meeting and at which Walco 
freely discussed its allegedly proprietary information. 
Walco has always asserted that its information was misappropriated after the 
proposals were opened at the public meeting at 3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012. (See, e.g., 
Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. (Nov. 29, 2013), at 1, 2, 4, 8, 14-15, 26.) No facts 
suggest that anyone opened, viewed, or misappropriated Walco's RFP response before it 
was unsealed and opened at the October 15, 2012 public meeting. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Walco has neither met its burden to defeat summary judgment nor to warrant 
reconsideration. For these reasons, the Court should deny VValco's motion for 
reconsideration and enter judgment for Idaho County on all claims. 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2014. 
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PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Whether a trade secret exists rests on a two-part definition under the ITSA. The 
Defenda...nts now agree that under the first part, a bid may be a trade secret. Additionally, the bid 
central to this case is a trade secret if it «[i]s the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy." {Idaho Code§ 48-801(5)). Thus, the question this Court 
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RECONSIDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-I 
should ask on reconsideration is the following: Under these unique circumstances did Walco take 
reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of its bid? Put another way, what more could Walco 
have done to protect itself under the circumstances that Idaho County and Simmons created? In 
order to decide this, the Court must consider the circumstances under which Walco submitted its 
sealed bid. Not only were the circumstances out of Walco's control, but even worse, the 
circumstances were not known to or understood by Walco until it was too late because Simmons 
and the County concealed their activities until discovery in this case revealed the true extent of 
what they had done. Yet, if the Court follows the Defendants' reasoning, the circumstances are 
not part of the equation of deciding if a trade secret exists-all that matters, in their view, is what 
Walco did. Of course, deleting one main trade secret variable is to the Defendants' distinct 
advantage, since that variable was the one within their sole control. Thus, on reconsideration, 
Walco requests that the variable-circumstances-be placed back into the equation for the 
Court's consideration. Further, Walco asserts that because those circumstances are material and 
are in dispute, summary judgment dismissing Walco's case should be reconsidered. 
MATERIAL FACTS AGREED UPON AND THOSE YET IN DISPUTE 
Of import, the Defendants now agree that their prior arguments were inaccurate and that 
the Idaho Trade Secret Act definition of trade secret is broad enough to include a bid amount. 
This was a pivotal issue when the Court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Defendants. The Defendant's now emphasize, in fact, that the issue is not whether a "bid or RFP 
response can ever constitute a trade secret under Idaho law ... " but whether Walco sufficiently 
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"maintain[ ed] the secrecy of its information 1 ."(Idaho County's Response Brief, p. 2, with 
Simmons joining in agreement with Idaho County"s briefing in full.) The parties also agree that 
at least one fact is pivotal: whether Commissioner Brandfs phone calls-and the subject matter 
thereof-to Robert Simmons after the bids were read and Walco's bid was discussed with 
Commissioners on October 15th is a disputed material fact that precludes summary judgment. 
Certainly, the record proves that Robert Simmons and Commissioner Brandt have different 
stories as to what transpired during those conversations. These are disputed issues of fact that 
are not ripe for summary judgment. 
A. The disputed. phone calls. 
The day the bids were unsealed, October 15, 2012, Brandt's conduct was nothing short of 
astounding.2 The meeting, which Simmons did not attend, was relatively short. Immediately 
1 Note that the Defendants specifically remove «reasonable under the circumstances" from the 
stated issue; however, the statement is generally in agreement with the Plaintiffs argument that 
the UTSA and ITSA definition of trade secret may not be as broad as the Restatement§ 39, but it 
is most definitely broader than § 757 and broad enough to include bid amounts. Also, the ITSA 
does not contain a continuous use requirement that would preclude a bid amount from the 
definition of trade secret under the ITSA as Defendants' had initially argued during summary 
judgment. (Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider, pp. 6-7). Defendants now agree that the ITSA does 
not contain a continuous use requirement (Idaho County's Reply Brief, p. 8). 
2 As outlined in Walco's motion for summary judgment, earlier in the summer of 2012, Brandt 
had emailed Simmons the contract information from Sunshine Disposal, who had been initially 
interested in bidding. Brandt did not email that information to Walco. Also, Brandt texted 
Simmons right away to tell him that only W alco had turned in another bid. He did not text W alco 
to tell them that Simmons was the only other bid. A review of texts sent between the two show 
that the two texted back and forth about the contract between October 12 and October 17, 2012 
as follows: 
10/12/2012 
10/13/2012 
10/13/2012 
10/13/2012 (12:57) 
10/13/2012 (12:58) 
10/13/2012 (12:59) 
Brandt: 
Simmons: 
Brandt 
Simmons 
Brandt: 
Simmons: 
Its in 
How mAny bids are there (sic) 
W ALCO dropped on off at 4:45, So 
just the two. 
K 
I would note that I do not no details. 
K 
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after the meeting Brandt called Simmons - twice - and conversed for 13.5 minutes. (Charney 
Declaration in Support of Cross-Motion, Exhibit D). Brandt admitted during depositions that he 
discussed the Walco bid and pricing information during those calls. About two hours later 
Simmons called Brandt They spoke for nearly half an hour. Brandt admitted during his 
deposition that, once again, he shared the details of Walco's bid proposal with Simmons. (Id., 
Exhibit E.) Simmons, on the other hand, denied this during his deposition. He claimed they 
discussed "elk hunting." (Id., Exhibit F). Such a disparity between the only two parties that 
participated in the call certainly creates an issue of fact. 
The question for this Court is if it matters. Walco asserts it does matter because the 
substance of the calls sheds light on whether or not Walco should have been more guarded in 
discussing its bid or should have chosen not to discuss it at all. It also proves at least two 
additional points: Simmons knew he had something to hide, and it proves that while Walco 
worked to maintain control of its trade secret, the Defendants' misuse of the bid process and 
misuse of Walco's bid information went beyond Walco's ability to control the secrecy of the bid 
amount. 
In other words, when Defendants argue that Walco itself discussed its bid in public, 
thereby waiving any trade secret status, the Defendants ask this Court to ignore the very 
nuances-the conditions unknown to W alco when it publicly discussed its bid-which also 
preclude summary judgment in this case. Of course Walco would not have publicly discussed 
the bid if it had known that the County was still working with Simmons to rehabilitate a bid that 
was clearly deficient. 
10/17/2012 Brandt: When you get back from h c give me a 
call. 
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B. Underlying circumstances existed that we:re beyond Wako's cont:rol or immediate 
knowledge. 
The Defendants argue that Walco's public discussions of their own bid amount estop 
them from claiming a trade secret exists, let alone was misappropriated. Certainly, a trier of fact 
could conclude that Walco's public discussions did not waive its trade secret claim. For one, the 
RFP document provides the trier of fact with an initial framework for which to decide whether, 
on October 15th, Walco could reasonably expect that one complete bid (Walco's) would not be 
either opened in front of or secretly shared with a bidder (Simmons) who had handed in an 
incomplete bid. In fact, this bid was so incomplete that the County allowed Simmons to complete 
the bid over the course of several more public meetings. It also adjusted the bid requirements to 
ensure that Simmons would obtain the bid. Likewise, Walco could also reasonably expect that 
neit.h.er a county official nor Simmons would undertake the secret review of Walco's numbers. 
The Defendants argue that whether W alco could reasonably expect these outcomes is testimony 
that Walco should have advanced in an affidavit. But this contention ignores the supporting 
documents that W alco bases this argument on. In other words, a trier of fact could just as likely 
come to the conclusion that Walco --or any other similarly situated person-could reasonably 
expect certain procedures based on the RFP, hearing and deposition transcripts, as it could from 
an affidavit. All would be admissible evidence, and the record is replete with support even 
without an affidavit stating that Walco reasonably relied on certain procedures. 
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To be sure, when Walco discussed its bid and pricing, it relied on the evidence and facts 
known to it at the time and that same information is available in the record. The bid evaluation 
forms specifically state that the bids would be evaluated in a preliminary review by County staff, 
not by County staff and the public and all competing bidders.3 Then, the RFP evaluation 
specified that if any bids were deemed incomplete, the County may contact that bidder to rehab 
his bid. It did not say that the County would discuss the incomplete bid in public and in 
comparison to a complete bid. Finally, the evaluation terms noted that interviews may be 
conducted if further issues arose with the bids. A reasonable juror could easily conclude that the 
evaluation terms specified that private, non-public meeting discussions with any bidder whose 
bid was incomplete would transpire. A reasonable juror could likewise conclude that W alco had 
the reasonable expectation that during th.ose interviews, the bids from competing bidders would 
not be divulged. Certainly th.e Public Records Act itself requires th.at the County to take 
reasonable steps to protect any trade secrets with. respect to bids. The language of the Public 
Records Act and the RFP establishes that the County had a duty of secrecy that Walco could 
reasonably rely on. Agai~ th.e Defendants claim th.at Walco offered no affidavit saying it did so. 
3 1. All Proposals received by the submission date identified in the 
Notice of Request for Proposal will be catalogued and distributed 
for preliminary review by County staff and/or its advisors. Each 
proposal will be reviewed for responsiveness and completeness by 
COUNTY and/or its advisors. At COUNTY'S discretion, proposers 
may be notified by COUNTY of omissions or of the need to modify 
the proposal, and a schedule of provision of the missing information 
or issuing an amended proposal may be established by COUNTY. 
2. Based on evaluation criteria set forth below, evaluation of 
Proposals found by COUNTY to satisfy minimum requirements 
will be conducted by COUNTY and/or its advisors. COUNTY may 
conduct interviews to discuss or clarify aspects of Proposals with 
some or all Proposers. (County RFP, Exhibit J 019). 
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However, this ignores a fundamental concept of summary judgment proceedings. All reasonabl.e 
inferences from the available evidence are to be construed in a light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Everything cited above is in the record and the inferences to be drawn from that 
evidence are not only reasonable; they are the most plausible explanation. 
Thus, when Walco discussed its bid without Simmons' presence at the October 15th 
meeting, it could reasonably expect that either both bids were already complete or that the 
County would interview each bidder with respect to incompleteness.4 On October 16th, Walco 
had no idea that Com.missioner Brandt had already divulged to Simmons the specifics they had 
discussed about their bid the day before as well as the entire contents of W alco written bid 
materials. W alco also had no way to know that the County would alter the bid requirements 
imposed on Simmons qfier the bids were unsealed, would allow Simmons access to Walco bid 
information, would allow Simmons to use that information to complete his bid and would allow 
Simmons to use Walco information to then undercut Walco. Additionally, once Walco realized 
the circumstances were such that the County was not allowing W alco to change its bid, but was 
allowing Simmons to change his services offered as well as his bid amounts, Walco did raise 
objections like those below and numerous others already briefed. By the end of the second 
meeting on October 16, in fact, Mr. Holman stated: 
So we left our bid with an exact number of what you're going to 
get. He [Simmons] left his bid with a gray area, a gray area that can 
pretty much be manipulated any way you want right now. It's not 
really a fair bid. (Simmons Reply Memorandum in Support ofMSJ, 
Appendix, Transcript of Hearings, p. 26, 11. 13-18). 
4 Idaho County originally maintained, and Kathy Ackerman testified by affidavit, that Simmons 
was present at the October 15th meeting. They amended their motion for summary judgment on 
October 31, 2013 to show that in fact, the only attendees were "all three County Commissioners, 
Ackerman, and representatives ofWalco. (Ackerman Am. Deel. ifif 7-8)."(Defendant Idaho 
County's Amended Memorandum, p. 4). 
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Thus, the jury will need to consider why the County continued to give Simmons leewc;1,y 
with the pricing of his services but not Walco such that Walco's bid price continued to be 
misappropriated. Walco asked County this question in discovery and in answer, the County 
responded: "Walco was never prevented from offering a different proposal than its original proposal 
either spontaneously in a public Commissioners' meeting or in a writing delivered to the 
Commissioners." The facts, once again show otherwise. Although the County attorney thought this 
might be a possibility, the Commissioners decidedly did not and would not allow Walco to reduce 
the services it had bid for in order to compete on the same field as Simmons. Instead, here is what 
Wal co was told during the final meeting that W alco was allowed to attend on October 23, 2012: 
Mr. Holman: So can we just tell you right now our bid is $65,000, and there's a 
bunch of things in there that we can talk about at negotiations because that would 
put us in negotiations first. Ours was specific. 
Mr. MacGregor: I think you can. I think if you want to say that we can sit here and 
negotiate with whoever we want. Yeah, you can say that. 
Mr. Holman: That sounds fair. Would that be fair to Robert? 
Commissioner Rockwell: (Inaudible) I think we should be in negotiations with the 
apparent low bidder. It's what we're supposed to do .... (Transcript, p. 90). 
The Commissioners shortly thereafter moved to negotiate only with Robert Simmons. The 
facts certainly support the argument that both the County and Simmons waited for Walco's final 
and detailed numbers-that were trade secrets- before finalizing those very same terms in 
Simmons' bid. A jury could most certainly decide that Walco did all that it could under the 
circumstances to protect its bid. It was, in fact, the Defendants who took a trade secret and 
misappropriated it. 
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Considering the circumstances, Wako reasonably protected its bid amount. 
of these issues prove that disputed material facts exist as to whether Walco reasonably 
protected its bid given the circumstances. To be sure, W alco believes that under the circumstances it 
did all it could have done, yet even in fight of the letter :from Mr. Charney requesting trade secret 
protection, even in light of the statute, even in light of the fact that the envelope with Walco' s bid 
was sealed, Idaho County still saw fit to reveal the information to Simmons and Simmons saw fit to 
run with it, even while calling his own unspecified numbers proprietary and in need of protection. 
Without a flawed and rigged bid process-the circumstance Walco was faced with-it is more 
likely than not that neither Simmons nor the County could have acquired or duplicated Walco' s bid. 
But given all of the circumstantial evidence, this is a material disputed fact for the jury to decide, not 
a legal issue that would dispose of the complaint. Had the County treated the process as a true 
sealed bid process, whereby the bids would be opened and the low bidder ·wins, Walco agrees that 
its information was no longer in need of protection past that point. However, the situation created 
by the County conclusively proves that this was not the process. Instead, the County improperly 
obtained Walco's trade secrets and shared them with a competing bidder before the completion of 
the bid process. What occurred is no less insidious than if Brandt had simply broken into the clerk's 
office the day before the bids were opened and shared the information with Simmons. The result 
was the same. Simmons was provided Walco's information by the County, before the bid process 
was complete, and allowed to use Walco' s information to ensure he would obtain the bid. 
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REBUTTAL TO DEFENDANTS' ADDmONAL ARGUMENTS 
not have been available but damages under the ITSA for 
The Defendants argue that if Walco really felt it had been Monged during the public bid 
discussions, then the legal remedy would have been to immediately seek an injunctio~ rather than 
work to mitigate its damages by discussing the validity and quality of its ovro bid in comparison to 
Simmons'. Yet, case law does not bear out this conclusion. In fact, an injunction would only be 
appropriate against threatened use or disdosure. JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th 
Cir. 2010). Here, the bid amount was already being actively used and disclosed in public meetings. 
Of course, it had already been disclosed by Brandt to Simmons during private phone calls. Once a 
trade secret has been misappropriated through unwarranted use or disclosure, then damages under 
the ITSA are appropriate but an injunction is not (Id.) Thus, Simmons' lengthy discussion about 
estoppel due to Walco's public bid discussions fails to prove that damages under the ITSA are not 
due if Simmons misappropriated Walco's bid amount 
B. Summary judgment should not be used to dispose of trade secret claims when 
circumstantial evidence is key and material facts are in dispute. 
Defendants overstate Plaintiff's use of the trade secret case law. Plaintiffs found trade secret 
cases wherein bid amounts were the key issue during summary judgment. From those cases, 
statutes, and the Restatements, Plaintiffs argued that under the ITSA, a bid could be considered a 
trade secret and that this Court should not dismiss the case on the sole belief that because a bid was 
not a continuous use activity that it could not be a trade secret Notably, Defendants now agree with 
that argument anyway. (Idaho County's Response Brief, p. 8). Plaintiffs did not assert, as 
Defendants believe, that all trade secret cases must be tried by a jrny. Rather, just as in any other 
summary judgment situation, the court should dismiss a trade secret misappropriation claim if there 
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are no disputed material facts as to whether a trade secret failed to exist or if misappropriation did 
' 
not occur. The Court should not dismiss Walco's claim because material disputed facts do exist as 
to whether W alco reasonably protected its bid under the circumstances. In fact there are many 
disputed material facts born out by the RFP phrasing, and numerous exhibits and depositions and 
hearing transcripts. Also, the misappropriation of the bid amount and details of the subject matter 
during the telephone calls between Brandt and Simmons is disputed between the two Defendants 
themselves. 
The cases Defendant cites to do nothing more than reiterate the proper use of summary 
judgment. For one, they are not cases wherein a bid amount is the alleged trade secret. Additionally, 
in each case, the court found there was not a disputed material fact that precluded summary 
judgment For instance in SITCO, Inc. v. AGCO Corp., a customer list shared by a fonner employee 
was the purported trade secret misappropriation. (2006 US. Dist. LEXIS 28001, 3-4 (D. Idaho Apr. 
7, 2006). The Court found that no confidentiality obligation was ever signed by or imposed on the 
employee and thus, the company did not, under the circumstances, reasonably seek to protect the 
customer list. Thus, the customer list was not a trade secret by definition. The Plaintiff could not 
dispute this. Thus, the court dismissed the claim in summary judgment In this case, Walco has 
delineated numerous reasons why they dispute the Defendants' claim that Plaintiff did not 
adequately protect its bid amount Thus SITCO is not instructive here. 
Second, in Northwest Bee-Corp. v. Home Living Serv., that trade secret case also involved 
customer lists. However, there, the parties agreed that the lists were trade secrets. The issue during 
summary judgment was whether the list had been misappropriated. The Court asked the Plaintiffs to 
provide exhibits other than affidavits to dispute the Defendant's assertions, but the Plaintiffs did not, 
relying instead on case law and affidavits that the Court had pointed out were deficient to begin 
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opening the bid, then allowing one bidder's bid to evolve, wrongfully lured Walco to bel_ieve the 
information would be kept from other bidders when the county had no intention of doing so. 
Thus, from the information known to Walco at the time the bids were opened, the bid would 
be awarded to the lowest bidder that satisfied the requirements in the bid proposal. Prior to that 
point Walco sent a letter, with respect to this process, requesting that its information be protected. 
Walco submitted the bid in a sealed envelope5 further evidencing the fact that it should be 
confidential. The documents upon which the bid was based led W alco to believe that the 
information would be treated confidentially and that the information would not be made known to 
other bidders before the bid process was complete. These are reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from the evidence in the record. 
Unbeknownst to W alco, the bid process was being rigged by one or more of the 
commissioners and Simmons. Walco justifiably believed that once the bids were opened, and 
examined for completeness, the contract would be awarded. Nothing that occurred in public gave 
Walco any reason to believe that Simmons and the County were evaluating, and then using, 
Walco's trade secrets in order to ensure that Simmons would obtain the contract. If Walco had 
known this, in advance, and then shared its information, and discussed the same, estoppel 
arguments and arguments about not taking steps to protect proprietary information may have more 
traction. However, the County and Simmons did not make their secret discussions known to Walco, 
nor did the County ever advise Walco that the bid specifications would be adjusted and tailored as 
the process evolved to ensure that Simmons got the contract. A reasonable trier of fact could well 
conclude that, had this information been known to W alco, it would have demanded, loud and clear, 
that its information be kept from Simmons. 
5 Ackerman Deel. ,r 6 & Ex. K to Defendant Idaho County's Amended J\1SJ Memorandum. 
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CONCLUSION 
reasonable trier of fact can conclude that the bid was, in fact, a trade secret. A reasonable 
trier of fact can conclude that W alco took sufficient steps to protect the trade secrets under these 
circumstances. A reasonable trier of fact can conclude that the County and. Simmons conspired to 
utilize--and thus, misappropriate--these secrets in order to ensure that Simmons obtained the 
contract. As such, summary judgment is not appropriate and the prior entry of summary judgment 
in favor of the Defendants should be reconsidered, and the case should proceed to trial. 
#;.; 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _iI day of March, 2014. 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-15 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
· 1_,1J . 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this / day of March, 2014, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
David Risley 
RISLEY LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1247 
1443 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208-743-5338 
Bentley G. Stromberg 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, PA 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
Chery 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) E-mail 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) E-mail 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' IV!OTIONFOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-16 
DENNIS M. CHARNEY ISB# 4610 
CHARNEY AND ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
1191 East Iron Eagle Dr., Ste. #200 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Telephone: (208) 246-8850 
Facsimile: (20~) 938-9504 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IDAHO GOUNTY D~STRICT COURT 
,. .. ,, > FILt.D 
AJC{ 1 ~} I_ O CLOCK .M. 
- ' 
1 1 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
W ALCO, INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political subdivision 
of the State of Idaho, and 
SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE, INC., 
an Idaho corporation, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ ) 
Case No. CV 42360 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENT TO 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Plaintiff, by and through its attorney of record, submits the following excerpts from 
the public Commissioner meetings conducted on October 16, 2012 and October 23, 2013. 
These excerpts are submitted in response to the Court's inquiry as to when and how the 
Plaintiff objected to the publication of the facts contained in their bid proposal. The 
excerpts also demonstrate that Plaintiff understood the preliminmy review, as identified in 
the bid request published by Idaho Cou.11ty, would be conducted without other potential 
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PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER--22 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
) 
W alco, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
County of Idaho, a political subdivision of ) 
the State of Idaho, and Simmons ) 
Sanitation Service, Inc., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No CV-2013-42360 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS 
INTRODUCTION 
PlaintiffWalco, Inc. (Yvalco), brought this action against defendants Idaho 
County and Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc. (Simmons), claiming intentional 
interference with an economic expectancy and misappropriation of a trade secret. 
Idaho County moved for summary judgment. Simmons joined in that motion. Walco 
then moved for summary judgment. At a hearing on December 20, 2018, this Court 
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orally granted the defendants' motions for summmy judgment; however, before a 
decision could be reduced to writing, Walco moved for reconsideration. For the 
reasons stated in this Memorandum Decision, summaiy judgment will be granted on 
defendants' motions. 
BACKGROUND 
For several decades, W alco provided solid waste disposal services for an area 
roughly described as western Idaho County. Simmons provided similar waste 
disposal services for an area roughly describE~d as eastern Idaho County for several 
years. Following negotiations for a ten-year renewal of the contract in 2012, the 
Idaho County Commissioners and Walco reach1~d an impasse regarding certain 
terms, and Walco eventually suggested that the Commissioners put the contract out 
to bid. The Commissioners responded to the impasse by publishing a request for 
proposals (RFP). Deel. of Kathy M. Ackennan, Ex. H., p. 1. Simmons successfully 
negotiated a ten year extension of its contract with Idaho County for the area that 
had been historically served by it. 
On September 11, 2012, the Commissionors approved publication of a 
proposed RFP for solid waste disposal SE:rvices for the area that had been 
historically served by Walco. The RFP was prepared and presented by the county's 
attorney Kirk MacGregor. Deel. of Kathy M Acherman, Ex. I, p. 2. The Board 
unanimously approved a modified version of the RFP to be published for two weeks 
in the Idaho County Free Press and to be published once in newspapers in Boise, 
Lewiston and Spokane. Id. The deadline for submitting a proposal was 5:00 P.M. 
' -
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. 
on October 12, 2012. The Commissioners scheduled a review of the proposals on 
October 15, with a formal discussion of the proposals scheduled for October 16. Id. 
The RFP contained a general explanation and description of the services 
sought to be procured for the county, and provided instructions explaining how to 
submit a response to the RFP. Deel. of Kathy 11,1. Ackerman, Ex. J. Additionally, the 
RFP provided a set of criteria by which a resportse would be judged, including prior 
experience, cost of services, ability to satisfy project performance requirements, and 
other qualitative factors. Id. The county reserved the right to "reject any and all 
Proposals." Id. Idaho County also provided the opportunity to review the previous 
contract for solid waste disposal services, and included a rubric for evaluation of 
proposals. Id. 
Simmons submitted its response to the RFP in an unsealed envelope at 3:04 
p.m. on October 12, 2012. Walco submitted its response to the RFP in a sealed 
envelope at 4:53 p.m. on October 12, 2012. Deel. of Kathy M. Ackerman, ~I 6; Ex. K. 
Simmons and Walco were the only entities to submit proposals. Both responses to 
the RFP were opened on October 15, 2012, by the Board of Commissioners at the 
previously scheduled public meeting. Discussion regarding the proposals began at 
this meeting, but the majority of discussion of the proposals among th<~ Board and 
representatives from Walco and Simmons, occurred at public meetings on October 
16 and 23, 2012.1 
1 The content of the public meetings is presented on two transcripts in the record. The October 15 
meeting is presented in Supplemental Declaraf:ion of Counsel, Ex. E, 6-9. The October 16 meeting is 
presented in Ex. E, 9-47. The October 23 meeting is presented in Ex. E, 47-97 and Ex. F. l-14. 
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Commissioner Rockwell indicated during the meeting on October 15 that he 
thought Walco's bid was incomplete, and thus non-responsive to the RFP. 
Supplemental Declaration of Counsel, Ex. E, 6: 10-13. On the other hand, 
Commissioners Rockwell and Brandt concluded at the October 16 and 23 meetings 
that Simmons's bid was complete. Id.,-Ex. E, 2:3:7-19, 27:10-15, 83:lG-24 (hearing 
transcript). At the October 16 meeting Walco representatives expressed their belief 
that the RFP process was fundamentally unfair, because it appeared to V\ralco that 
it had submitted a complete bid while Simmons had not, and yet Simmons's bid wa_s 
still being considered. See, e.g., id., Ex. E, 26-~!8. Much of the discussion centered 
around the competing prices quoted by the two companies for the services sought. 
See generally, id., Ex. E, 9...:.47_ 
When pressed for information on how Simmons reached the final number in 
its bid, Simmons expressed a desire to reveal that information in executive session. 
Id., Ex. E, 35:14-15. Walco's representatives argued that Simmons's information 
would need to come out as public under the bid process. Id., Ex. E, 36. However 
Simmons refused to reveal its method of computing the final bid price unless it 
could do so in executive session. Id., Ex. E, ~37:~~-3. Commissioner Brandt stated 
that part of the next meeting would be held in executive session. Id., Ex. E. 37:11-
12. 
At the beginning of the October 23 meeting, Commissioner Brandt 
specifically noted that the Commissioners had "opted not to go into executive 
session .... " Id., Ex. E., 47:12-13. Simmons then explained its method of 
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computing the final price in its proposal in hgfic of Commissioner Brandt's 
statement. Id., Ex. E, 47:14-48:8. 
The Commissioners eventually dEicided that the county would enter into 
negotiations with Simmons, as the apparent low bidder. Id., Ex. E, 68:19-25, 69:4-
12, 90:20-25, 93:13-19. On November 30, 201~!, the Commissioners executed a 
contract with Simmons for the solid waste disposal services. Deel. of Kathy M. 
Ackerman, Exs. U, V. The contract took effect ,Yanuary 1, 2013. Id. at Exs. U, V. 
On January 7, 2013, Walco filed a Notice of Tort Claim with the county, which the 
county denied on February 191 2013. Id. at Exs. Y and Z. Walco brought this 
lawsuit against Idaho County and Simmons alleging two causes of action: tortious 
interference with a prospective economic benefit, against Idaho County, and 
misappropriation of a trade secret under the Idaho Trade Secrets Act (ITSA), 
against both Idaho County and Simmons. 
Idaho County and Simmons moved for summary judgment. Simmons relied 
heavily on Idaho County's motion for summary judgment. Defendant Idaho 
County's Am. Mem. in Support of Motion for Swnm. Judg.; Defendant Simmons 
Sanitation Service, Inc. 's Mem. in Support of Motion for Summ. Judg. \Valeo 
brought a cross-motion for summary judgment, requesting that this Court 
determine that the RFP process was actually an invitation for bids. Plaintiff's 11;Jem,. 
in Support of Cross-Motion for Summ. Jndg. Idaho County objected to \Valco's 
cross-motion as untimely, procedurally flawed, and without legal or factual 
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foundation. Defendant Idaho County's Jl;fem. in Opp. to Plaintiff's Cross-1i1otion for 
Summ. Judg. 
At the hearing on December 20, 2013, this Court orally announced its 
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Before this Court 
could reduce its oral pronouncement to a writtEm decision, V\ralco filed a motion for 
reconsideration. This Court has reviewed the additional briefing and heard 
telephonic argument on the Motion for Reconsideration on April 7, 2014. Dennis 
Charney appeared on behalfofWalco. ~roshua McKarcher appeared on behalf of 
Idaho County. David Risley appeared on behalf of Simmons. This Court now issues 
this decision, in which summary judgment is granted to the defendants (albeit on 
slightly different grounds than those stated at the hearing on December 20, 2013). 
LAVV 
Standard for Granting or Denying Summary Judgment 
Under I.R.C.P. 56(c), summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file show the absence of any genuine issue 
of material fact, and also show· that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter oflaw. Motions for summary judgment must be granted with caution . .Bonz 
v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991). If the record contains 
conflicting inferences or reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, 
summary judgment must be denied. Id. 
When considering a motion for summary judgment, all facts must be liberally 
construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. Additionally, ail reasonable 
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inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. The burden for 
establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact rests, at all times, 
with the party moving for summary judgment. Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147 
Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). A nonmoving party cannot resist a 
motion for summary judgment by merely resting upon allegations in the pleadings, 
but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Curlee v. 
Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394-95, 224 P.3d 458, 461-62 
(2008). 
AN}.1.LYSIS 
Walco Has Conceded Its Claim for Tortiious Interference With Contract 
On December 16, 2013, Wako filed jts Response in Opposition to the motion 
for summary judgment brought by Idaho County and Simmons. In that Response, 
Walco wrote, "Walco agrees that its tortious interference claim is precluded because 
it did not allege a claim against a third party but against Idaho County, a party to 
the contract." Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to County of Idaho's and Simmons' 
Motions for Summary Judgment at 25. '\Valeo has thus conceded that it cannot 
pursue its claim for tortious interference with contract, and it is therefore 
appropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of Idaho County on this count of 
the complaint. 
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Walco Cannot Establish That It Made Reasonable Efforts to Maintain the 
Confidentiality of Trade Secrets in Its Submission to Idaho County 
The Idaho Trade Secrets Act (ITSA) is set forth in I.C. §§ 48-801 to 48-807. 
Under LC.§ 48-803, a complainant is entitled to recover damages for 
misappropriation of a trade secret. A trade secret is "information, including a 
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: 
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other 
persons who can obtain economic value from iti:. disclosure or use; and (b) Is the 
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its 
secrecy ... " LC. § 48-801(5). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that the factors set forth in the 
Restatment (First) of Torts§ 757, comment b, assist the fact finder in identifying a 
trade secret. Basic American, Inc. u. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 735, 992 P.2d 175, 184 
(1999). Those factors include (1) the extent to which the information is known 
outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others 
involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the 
secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his 
competitors; (5) the amount of effort or morn~y expended by him in developing the 
information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly 
acquired or duplicated by others. RestatemEmt (First) of Torts§ 757, cmt. b. 
The gravamen of Walco's claim is that the amount it bid constitutes a trade 
secret. Information that is not continuously used in the operation of a business, but 
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1s subject of a one-time transaction may be a trade secret under the Idaho Trade 
Secrets Act. Compare Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition§ 39, comment d, 
with Restatement (First) of Torts § 7 59, comment b; see also Basic .American, 133 
Idaho at 735, n. 2, 992 P.2d at 184, n. 2 (noting that the ITSA definition of a trade 
secret was narrower than the Restat<~ment (Third) of Unfair Comp,etition definition, 
but not stating any relation to the Restatement (First) of Torts definition). 
Assuming for the sake of argument that Walco's submission contained valuable 
proprietary information (i.e. a trade secret), the facts of this case would not allow a 
reasonable jury to conclude that Walco made reasonable efforts to maintain the 
confidentiality of its trade secret. Consequently, summary judgment for the 
defendants is apprnpriate under these facts. 
Idaho has no pattern jury instruction regarding a claim under the Idaho 
Trade Secrets Act. However, California Civil Jury Instruction 4404 sE:ts out the law 
applicable to determine the care required to maintain a trade secret. That jury 
instruction lists eight factors in determining whether or not a plaintiff has made 
reasonable efforts to keep the information S<';CrEit. The eight factors are: 
1) Whether documents or computer files containing the information were 
marked with confidentiality warnings; 
2) \iVhether plaintiff instructed its employe(:S to treat the information as 
confidential; 
3) Whether plaintiff restricted access to the information to persons who 
had a business reason to know the information; 
4) Whether plaintiff kept the information in a restricted or secured area; 
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5) Whether plaintiff required emplo:;,ees or others with acc(~ss to the 
information to sign confidentiality or nondisclosure agreements; 
6) Whether plaintiff took any action to prot,act the specific information, or 
whether it relied on general measures taken to protect its business 
information or assets; 
7) The extent to which any general measunis taken by plaintiff would 
prevent the unauthorized disclosure of the information; 
8) Whether there were other reasonable measures available to plaintiff 
that it did not take. 
After carefully considering these :factors, (and these factors appear to be an 
accurate statement of the law as they relate to assessing whether a prospective 
plaintiff did what was necessary to maintain confidentiality of a trade secret) it is 
clear Walco cannot demonstrate that its efforts were reasonable to maintain a trade 
secret, even assuming its bid amount constituted a trade secret. 
Considering the first factor, Walco's submission to Idaho County, while 
sealed, did not contain any warning of confidentiality. The document could have 
easily been marked "CONFIDENTIAL". How,:Ner, it was not. The sealing of the 
envelope does not indicate the information was intended to be held in confidence. 
In addition, the public records act, Title 9, Chapter 3 of the Idaho Code, states that 
it is presumed that information provided to a public body is public. I.C. §§ 9-337 
and 9-338. If Walco wanted its submission to be treated as a trade secret, its 
actions fell far short of what was requirnd. to do so. 
Considering the second factor, there is no evidence, one way or the other, 
indicating that Walco instructed its employees to maintain the information it 
submitted as confidential. In fact, the actions of Walco's representatives at the 
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public meetings suggest that if they were instructed to keep the information secret, 
they acted contrary to that instruction in discussing the information contained in 
the submission. Also, when Simmons asked to have its submission considered in an 
executive session, thereby implying its submission was confidential, \,Valeo, through 
its agents, objected. Supplemental Declaration of Counsel, Ex. E, 3.5-36. Walco 
cannot contend that its submission was confidE:ntial and at the same timEi argue its 
competitor's submission was public. 
Under the third factor, there is nothing to suggest that Walco restricted access 
to its submission. As previously noted, the envelope was not marked "confidential". 
There was nothing in the submission indicating it was confidential. 2 The public 
nature of the meeting suggested that any number of citizens without a business 
2 Walco tries to attach significance to a letter sent to the Commissioners in June 2012 asserting a claim of 
trade secrets. The problems with attaching significance to that letter are multiple. First, the letter is 
drafted in the present tense.· "With respect to Wako' s proprietary information, we respectfully request 
that any proprietary information held by the county be retained by the county and treated as exempt 
under the Public Records Act." Deel. of Kathy M. A.cl?.emwn, Ex. E (emphasis added). As a result it 
does not put the Commissioners on notice that they should view future submissions as h·ade secrets. 
More importantly, trade secrets require on~going vigilance. See Restatement (First) of Torts §757, 
comment b "[A) substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that, except by the use of improper means, 
there would be difficulty in acquiring the information"; see also, Restatement (fhird) of Unfair 
Competition §391 comments f-g "fIJnformalion that is disclosed in a patent or contained in published 
materials reasonably accessible to competitors does not quaJjfy for protection under this Section .... 
Precautions taken to maintain the secrecy of information are relevant in determining whether the 
information qualifies for protections as a trade secret." Nothing in the subsequent submission asserted a 
claim of confidentiality. Failure to maintain a claim of confidentiality constitutes a waiver of the right to 
assert a trade secret. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition§ 39, comment f (noting that trade 
secret rights may not be asserted in information that is in tl1e public domain, and that information that is 
no longer sufficiently secret may not serve as a basis for recovery lmder trade secrets Iavv). Finally, 
Walco' s counsel acknowledged at oral argument that his efforts following the opening of the bids by 
Wako and Simmons were in an effort to "mitigate .. , Walco1 s damages when it became clear that the 
process was not unfolding as originaIIy envisioned. A trade secret requires vigilance at the outset and 
throughout the process. A trade secret is like a genie in a bottle. Once the genie escapes .. there is no 
putting it back in the bottle. Wako was not vigilant at the outset. Its claims of a tradie secret violation are 
in reality an eleventh hour recognition that its submission was being rejected and its subsequent efforts to 
undo that process. 
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reason to know of Walco's submission could attend and learn the information 
contained in its submission. As noted, W alco objected to the idea of an E,xecutive 
session when it was suggested by its competitor. The clear implication is that Walco 
preferred the public format. As a result, no rE~asonable juror could determine that 
W alco restricted access to those with a business reason to know the information. 
The fourth factor asks whether the plaintiff kept the information in a restricted 
or secured area, and the fifth factor asks whether employees or others with access 
were held to confidentiality or prohibited from disclosing the information. Both of 
these factors inquire into the amount of internal control the plaintiff exercised to 
protect its trade secret. Walco has provided no evidence suggesting that it took efforts 
to protect the confidentiality of the information internally. There is no suggestion that 
prior to the submission the information was kept in any safe or vault, nor is there any 
suggestion of confidentiality or nondisclosure agreements. 
Factor six asks whether the plaintiff took any action to protect the specific 
information, or instead relied on general measures to protect its business information 
or assets, and factor seven asks about the extent of protection afforded by general 
measures to protect the information. Both of these factors delve into how focused the 
plaintiffs efforts to protect confidentiality were, and how effective those measures 
were. Essentially, these factors ask how serious the plaintiff was about protecting the 
trade secret in particular. Walco's efforts resemble reliance on general measures 
rather than measures specifically tailored to protect the information in question. 
Even VValco's assertion of"proprietary information" is a general warning rather than 
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specifically instructing Idaho County that the amount of the bid itself was confidential 
and not to be disclosed to Simmons or the public. (Walco maintains the letter its 
attorney sent in June 2012 raises a question of fact regarding its assertion that its 
submission in October 2012 was confidential. AE noted, this letter is insufficient to 
create a question of fact regarding efforts undertaken by Walco to maintain its 
response to the RFP was intended to be confidential.) A reasonable juror could not 
determine that a letter, sent months before the submission deadline, instructing the 
Commissioners to consider anything "held'' by them at the time to apply to some 
future submission. 
Under the last factor, it is obvious that Wa.lco could have done much more to 
maintain the secrecy of its submission. The use of confidential warnings, advance 
agreements to maintain confidentiality, requiring executive sessions, and refusal to 
discuss the trade secrets in Simmons's presence ·would have more effectively 
accomplished Walco's goal, if that was Walco's intent. Furthermore, these efforts were 
ail reasonably within Walco's grasp, and could have easily been employed. 
These facts lead this Court to conclude that Walco's submission did not contain 
trade secrets, because the submission was not "the subject of efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." I.C. § 48-801(5)(b). 
Walco's efforts were meager at best. Even giving \Valeo all the inferences it is entitled 
to as the non-moving party, it cannot show its efforts were reasonable under the 
circumstances. As a result, while Walco may claim its submission contained a trade 
secret, it cannot establish that it did what is required to create a question of fact 
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regarding maintaining its confidentiality. No reasonable jury could so find on these 
facts. As a result summary judgment is appropriate. 
Walco Should Be Estopped From Asserting a Trade Secret Claim, Where 
Idaho County Held a Privilege to Disclose the Information 
The Restatement also indicates in§ 757, comment d, that a "privilege to 
disclose or use another's trade secret may ariE>e from the other's consent or from other 
conduct on his part by which he is estopped from complaining." Such is the case here. 
Walco engaged in extensive public discussion of the specifics of its submission and 
openly compared it to Simmons's submission. This discussion occurred at meetings 
that were public. Anyone could att(md. and listen to the argument over the merits of 
each proposal submitted to the County. 
Even under Walco's theory that this procEiss was one for competitive bids rather 
than an alternative RFP process, the statutory provisions governing competitive bids 
contemplate the opening of bids in the presence of the public. In the bid processes 
contained in LC.§§ 67-2805 and 67-2806, no matter if it is a process for services, or 
public works bids, the sealed bids "shall be opened in public at a designated place 
and time ... " (emphasis supplied). LC.§§ 67-2805(3)(a)(v), 67-2805(3)(b)(ix), 67-
2806(2)(e). Consequently, even if this Court WE.re to grant Walco's motion for 
summary judgment and conclude that the County's request for proposals was in fact 
a request for bids, it would defeat Walco's claim for misappropriation of a trade 
secret because that process must be public. 
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The circumstances created by a public bidding process furnish Idaho County 
with such a privilege to evaluate, discuss, and use Walco's submission such that 
Walco is estopped from asserting a claim for misappropriation of one's trade secret. 
As a result, W alco' s trade secret claim does not ,:lstablish a prirna facie case, since 
Walco did not make sufficient efforts to maintain confidentiality, and Walco should 
be estopped from asserting a trade secret claim since Idaho County held a privilege 
to use and disclose the information submitted by W alco in the way it was submitted. 
CONCLUSION 
W alco argued at length that the procurement process in this case was 
fundamentally unfair. Indeed, there is evidence that one of Idaho County's 
Commissioners inappropriately engaged in lengthy conversations with Walco's 
competitor after the RFPs were unsealed and before Idaho County executed a contract 
with that competitor. However, this is not thE! cause of action that Walco chose to 
pursue. Instead, it chose to assert a claim of tortious interference, which it later 
conceded was not valid, and a misappropriation of a trade secret claim, which is not a 
viable claim under these facts. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate and is 
granted to the defendants on the claims of tortious interference with contract and 
misappropriation of trade secrets. 
Dated this 2'1 ~ of May 2014, 
Jol~ R. Stegner 
District -tT udge 
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2 9 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND I?OR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
Walco, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, ) Case No CV-2013-42360 
) ~ 
Plaintiff, ) ,,JUDGMENT 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
County of Idaho, a political subdivision of ) 
the State of Idaho, and Simmons ) 
Sanitation Service, Inc., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
________________ ) 
JUDGMENT is entered in favor ofthEi Defendants, County ofldaho and 
Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc., and the Complaint filed by the plaintiff, W alco, 
Inc., and all of the causes of action pleaded in that complaint are DISMISSED 
WITH PREJUDICE. 
1--
Dated this -Z'/ day of May 2014. 
-r2~ J ~1 R. Stegner 
District .Judge 
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IN THE UISTRICT COURT OF THE SECONU JUUICIAL UISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANU FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
W ALCO, INC., an Idaho Corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiff/ Appellants, ) 
) Case No. CV-2013-42360 
V. ) 
) 
COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political subdivision ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
of the State ofldaho, and ) 
) 
SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE, INC., ) 
an Idaho corporation, ) 
) 
Defendants/ Respondents. ) 
________________ ) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, County of Idaho and Simmons Sanitation 
Service, Inc. AND THE RESPONDENTS' ATTORNEYS Respectively, Bentley 
Stromberg and David Risley, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, Walco, Inc., appeals against the above-named 
Respondents to the Supreme Court of Idaho from the District Judges Division of the 
Idaho Second District Court's "Judgment," which was dismissal of Appellant's claims 
against Respondents entered in the above-entitled action on the 29th day of May, 2014, 
District Judge, John R. Stegner, presiding. 
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Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of 
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Defendant Idaho County's Reply to 
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Motion for Summary Judgment 
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Service, Inc. 's Reply Memorandum in 
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Notice Of Hearing w/Notice of 
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Hearing Scheduled (Motion 
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Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider 
Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Defendant Simmons Sanitation 
Service, Inc. 's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration 
Defendant Idaho County's Response 
to Walco's Motion to Reconsider 
Grant of Summary Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing w/Notice of 
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Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' 
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Reconsider Granting Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Plaintiff's Supplement to Motion to 
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Memorandum Decision Granting 
Summary Judgment to Defendants 
Judgment 
CIVIL DISPOSITION 
2. The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable judgment under and pursuant 
to Rule 1 l(a)(l) I.AR. 
3. Appellant seeks an appeal based on the following issues which does not prevent 
the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal: 
Issue 1: Whether the Court properly granted the motion for summary judgment 
when there were facts in the record upon which a jury could have concluded that Walco 
did take steps to protect its trade secret. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL--4 
COPY 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? no 
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript: 
Not applicable 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. 
7. I certify: 
(c) (1) [X] That the estimated fee ($100) for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid. 
( d) (1) [X] That the appellate filing fee ($109) has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THI~J"½iay of June, 2014. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-5 
Dennis M. Charney 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY ~ERTIFY that on this ,,,,2,1.:flday of June, 2014, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
David Risley 
RISLEY LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1247 
1443 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208-743-5338 
Bentley G. Stromberg 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, PA 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-6 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(x) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(x) Facsimile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
Walco, Inc., 
Pia i ntiff / Appel I ant, 
vs. 
County of Idaho, 
And Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc. 
Defendants/Respondents. 
STATE OF IDAHO) 
) 
County of Idaho ) 
) 
) 
) Supreme Court No. 42296 
) 
) Idaho County No. CV 13-42360 
) 
) 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
) RE: EXHIBITS 
) 
I, Kathy Johnson, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Idaho, hereby certify that the 
following are all the exhibits admitted or rejected to-wit: 
No exhibits were presented in this case 
Kathy M. Ackerman, Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE RE: EXHIBITS - 1 
1x·L1L/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
Walco, Inc., 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
County of Idaho, 
And Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc. 
Defendants/Respondents. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
County of Idaho ) 
) 
) IDAHO COUNTY NO. CV 13-42360 
) S.C. No. 42296 
) 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
) 
) 
) 
) 
I, Kathy Johnson, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District, of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Idaho, do hereby certify that the 
above and foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction, and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents as are 
automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I, do further certify, that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above entitled 
cause, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the court 
reporter's transcript and the clerk's record, as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
. 
said Court at Grangeville, Idaho, this 1st day of August 2014. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 2 
IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
Ci s, ;i:_::o i\ 
AT l ' 1 'J CLOCK !T' .M .. 
A'J3 2 6 20i4 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
WALCO, INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, and 
SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
) Case No CV-2013-42360 
) 
) AMENDED JUDGMENT 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
In favor of Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc., and against Walco, Inc., in the 
amount of $2,081.74 in costs; and in favor of the Defendant, County of Idaho and 
against Walco, Inc., in the amount of $1,307.45 in costs. 
Dated this __ I day of August 2014. 
JUDGMENT 
n R. Stegner 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that full, true, complete, and correct copies of the foregoing 
order were delivered to: 
Dennis Charney 
Attorney at Law 
1191 E Iron Eagle Drive, #200 
Eagle, ID 83616 
David R. Risley 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 1247 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Bentley G. Stromberg 
Attorney at Law 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[ U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ e>] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ,/J U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
"Ji . 
On this:xU day of August 2014. 
KATHY M. ACK RMAN, CLEFlK 
~./ ... · ., · · , r 
,,.1\( l~tA 
JUDGMENT 
